A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a Suspect Class under the Equal Protection Clause by Burgdorf, Marcia Pearce & Burgdorf, Robert, Jr.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 4 Article 3
1-1-1975
A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a
Suspect Class under the Equal Protection Clause
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf
Robert Burgdorf Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf and Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a Suspect
Class under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 Santa Clara Lawyer 855 (1975).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/3
A HISTORY OF UNEQUAL TREATMENT: THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS
AS A "SUSPECT CLASS" UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf*
Robert Burgdorf, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION
The last half decade has witnessed the addition of a new
minority group, handicapped persons, to the ranks of those societal
elements, including Blacks,1 Mexican Americans,2 women,3 reli-
gious sects,4 illegitimate children, 5 aliens,6 and welfare recipients, 7
who have taken recourse to the United States judicial system in
their quest for equality. Litigation dealing with the legal rights
of handicapped people began on a broad front early in the 1970's,
and there are presently more than 150 such cases either com-
pleted or pending, covering a wide range of legal issues.
As with other groups seeking equal opportunities in our
society, a major legal tool of handicapped persons in attack-
ing discrimination has been the fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tee of "equal protection of the laws."" Equal protection argu-
ments have been the focus of litigation aimed at securing and safe-
* B.A., 1969, Manhattanville College, N.Y.; J.D., 1972, University of Notre
Dame; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Director of the De-
velopment Disabilities Law Project, and Consultant to the President's Committee
on Mental Retardation.
** A.B., '1970, J.D., 1973, University of Notre Dame. Mr. Burgdorf has been
involved in a number of lawsuits dealing with the legal rights of handicapped per-
sons, and has authored several publications dealing with special education and the
law.
1. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d
142, on remand, 350 F. Supp. 1241 (1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, 922,
rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
6. See, e.g.,__Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in relevant part: "No state shall
• . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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guarding, among others, the following legal rights of handicapped
persons: equal opportunity for education;' right to residential and
treatment services in the least restrictive environment; 10 freedom
from involuntary servitude;" freedom from restrictive zoning or-
dinances;12 free access to public buildings and transportation sys-
tems; 13 freedom from confinement in the absence of proper com-
mitment procedures; 14 and the ight to procreate. 15
The purpose of this article is to consider the degree to which
handicapped persons, as a group, merit special judicial attention
within the framework of the equal protection clause. Initially, the
article will describe the composition of the grouping "handicapped
persons," and will examine, from an historical perspective, the
discrimination against handicapped people in two significant areas
of state involvement: public education and residential institu-
tionalization.
In conjunction with the historical discussion of unequal treat-
ment, the article will examine recent court decisions which have
struck down this pattern of discrimination and have recognized
many of the legal rights of handicapped citizens. Subsequently,
the article will focus upon the criteria for "suspectness" under the
equal protection clause, and explore the extent to which legislation
and administrative regulations affecting handicapped people are
predicated upon such "suspect" classifications.
9. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp.
866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); see note 136
infra.
10. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 489 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
373, 380, 384 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (App. A, §§ 2, 7, 26); see notes 234-77 and
accompanying text inIra.
11. See, e.g., Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
12. See, e.g.,..Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449(1974); Unteed v. Lehman, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 150 N.E.2d 509 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Thoben v. Eastern Airlines, No. 74-937, (D.D.C., filed June 20,
1974); Urban League v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(D.D.C. 1973). See generally Sorkin, Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Civil
Right for the Physically Handicapped, 78 CASE & COMMENT 41 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Sorkin]; Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate
the Rights o1 the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501, 1509 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Abroad in the Land].
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Lessard v. Smith, 349
F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 313
F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Adderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Wade
v. Bethesda, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). See generally Murdock, Steril-
ization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CAMiu. L. REV. 917
(1974).
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I. WHO ARE "HANDICAPPED" PERSONS?
A. General Definition
The dictionary defines "handicap" as "a disadvantage that
makes achievement unusually difficult."' 16 When used generi-
cally, however, terms like "the handicapped" have a narrower
meaning, referring to a particular type of "disadvantage"-a
mental, physical, or emotional disability or impairment. 1 7  Thus,
a handicapped person is an individual who is afflicted with a
mental, physical, or emotional disability or impairment which
makes achievement unusually difficult. It should be emphasized
that physical, mental, or emotional disabilities qualify as handicaps
only if they hinder achievement. Moreover, the phrase "unus-
ually difficult" makes it clear that the hindrance must be substan-
tial; a slight inconsequential disability or impairment is not a handi-
cap.
But to be complete, this description requires one final
element: a social judgment. A person truly qualifies as handi-
capped only when he or she is so labeled by others. Certain rela-
tively severe types of impairments, such as blindness, deafness,
absence or paralysis of arms or legs, or serious degrees of mental
retardation or of mental illness, are nearly always considered handi-
caps in our society. Other impairments, such as the absence of a
finger or a toe, mild mental retardation and emotional disturbance,
color or night blindness, partial hearing loss, and many others, may
or may not be considered handicaps. A person can be handicapped
for one purpose and not for another; for example, the "six hour
mentally retarded child" is considered mentally retarded during the
time he or she is in school but copes well and is considered "normal"
outside the academic environment.' 8
In a sense, "handicapped" is an artificial grouping created
by the labeling process in our society.' 9 From the broad spectrum
16. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1027 (3d ed. 1966).
17. "Handicapped" is both the accepted everyday expression and a common
statutory term for describing persons having such disabilities or impairments. See,
e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1011.3 (West 1974); CAL. EDuc. CODE § 6941
(West 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-604 (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.03
(Page 1974).
However, use of a handicapping condition as a collective noun, as "the handi-
capped" or "the mentally retarded," is generally disfavored by handicapped indi-
viduals and their advocates, because it tends to stress the differentness of such
people rather than the characteristics they share with others. Adjectival or prepo-
sitional phraseology such as "handicapped people," "mentally retarded citizens,"
"persons with cerebral palsy," "individuals with handicapping conditions," are pre-
ferred.
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE Six HouR RE-
TARED CHILD 1 (1969) (pamphlet published by U.S. Dep't of H.E.W.).
19. See, e.g., Rains, Kitsuse, Duster & Freidson, The Labeling Approach to
1975]
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of human characteristics and capabilities certain traits have been
singled out and called handicaps.2" The fine line between
"handicapped" and "normal" has been arbitrarily drawn by the
"normal" majority. Frequently, the various disabilities called
"handicaps" have nothing in common except the label itself:
Whatever characteristics such individuals may or may not
have had in common prior to their classification, it is their
involvement in the classification process that has generated
the characteristics they all share-their social fate as mem-
bers of a status category. 21
Moreover, a person whose condition need not be a substantial
impediment may become "handicapped" if he or she is labeled
and treated as "handicapped" by members of society. Educators
and psychologists use the term "self-fulfilling prophecy" to de-
scribe a process whereby persons assigned stigmatizing labels tend
to conform to the expectations created by such labels.22 This
effect may be magnified when, as in the case of handicapped per-
sons, the label has practical and legal ramifications.
B. State Action Factor
Equal protection challenges under the fourteenth amend-
ment are confined to the realm of state action.23  Combining the
concept of "state action" with those definitional characteristics
already mentioned steers any meaningful legal inquiry in the direc-
tion of handicapped persons who have been the subject of dis-
criminatory actions by state officials, whether through statutes, ad-
ministrative practices, or general policies. For purposes of this dis-
cussion, handicapped persons, as a class, may be described as those
individuals: (a) afflicted with mental, physical, or emotional dis-
abilities or impairments which make achievement unusually diffi-
cult; or (b) labeled inaccurately as having a disability or impair-
ment; and (c) subjected by virtue of (a) or (b), above, to
discriminatory treatment by state legislation, policies or practices.
Deviance, in 1 ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN 88, 91 (N. Hobbs ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Rains].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 91-92. For this reason, it is proper to treat "handicapped persons"
as a single class for purposes of legal analysis, even though the underlying physi-
cal, mental, or emotional handicapping conditions of individuals included in that
grouping may be quite dissimilar. All such persons are similar in that they have
been considered "handicapped" and suffered the consequences thereof.
22. Popularized by R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobson in PYGMALION IN THE
CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPIL'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
(1968). See also Rains, supra note 19, at 97-98; Guskin, Bartel & MacMillan,
Perspective of the Labeled Child, 2 ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN
189-212 (N. Hobbs ed. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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The class of handicapped persons, as defined herein, is
composed of two distinctly ascertainable subgroups. "Handi-
capped persons" encompasses all people who are subjected to dis-
criminatory state action because they are classified by state
agencies and officers as fitting into one of the officially recognized
categories of handicapping conditions; or even though not so
identified, they are, in fact, demonstrably afflicted by a handi-
capping condition which falls within one of the officially recog-
nized categories.
1. Those categorized by official state processes.
First, the term "handicapped persons" encompasses all those
people who have been diagnosed, labeled, or otherwise classified
by state legislation, state officials, and state agencies as having a
handicap. Thus, the state and its categorization processes define
who is handicapped. To determine this class of handicapped per-
sons, one need only focus upon those persons singled out by stat-
utes and administrative regulations for differential treatment
because of a handicapping condition.
Although there are some terminological differences from
state to state, the following are among the most common handicap-
ping conditions resulting in discriminatory treatment by state agen-
cies and legislatures: deafness or impaired hearing,24 blindness
or impaired sight,25 epilepsy, 26 cerebral palsy, 27 autism,28 mental
illness, 9 physical or crippling disability," emotional disturbance,"'
24. See, e.g., CAL. EDuC. CODE § 2575 et seq. (West 1969); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 80-101 et seq. (1947); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3323.03, 3323.06,
3325 (Page 1972).
25. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 2575 et seq. (West 1969); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 80-101 et seq. (1966). Almost all states have "White Cane Laws."
E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 304.080-304.110 (Vernon 1959).
26. See, e.g., CAL. VEI. CODE § 12805 (West 1971) (recent amendments have
deleted the use of the word "epileptic," but the intent of the section is apparently
unchanged), and similar statutes discussed in Fabing & Barrow, Restricted Driver's
Licenses to Controlled Epileptics: A Realistic Approach to a Problem of High-
way Safety, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 500 (1955). See generally Perr, Epilepsy and the
Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 280 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Perr].
27. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 447.45 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 202.504.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-604(3)(c)
(1974).
28. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 6750.1 (West 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
202.504.2(4) (Vernon Supp. 1975).
29. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 et seq. (1971). See generally
Ennic, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1971).
30. CAL. VEH. CODE § 9105 (West 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-11-101
(Supp. 1974); id. § 49-7-19 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 80-105 (1966);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-604(3) (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page
1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.53(2) (1966). For a judicial definition, see, e.g.,
People v. Lockwood, 308 Mich. 618, 14 N.W.2d 517, 518 (1944). See generally
Sorkin, supra note 13; Note, Abroad in the Land, supra note 13.
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-225(1) (1958); Miss. CODE ANN.
1975]
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speech impairment,12 mental retardation,83  and certain other
neurological and educational impairments."4
2. Those not categorized by official state processes.
In addition to those persons identified by the state as being
handicapped, there is another, smaller group of persons who,
although they have not officially been labeled as handicapped, are
in fact afflicted with a handicapping condition and face discrimina-
tory treatment because of it. For example, a person confined
to a wheelchair may not have come to the attention of the state
and officially been classified as physically disabled. Yet that per-
son does have a serious handicap and may be subjected to unequal
treatment because of it, as where, for example, he or she wishes
to enter a public building which is not accessible to wheelchairs.3 5
Similarly, numerous handicapped children remain unidenti-
fied within the normal classroom population.36  Because they have
not been diagnosed as handicapped, they are not being provided
appropriate educational programs. But in reality they do have
disabilities and need educational services suited to their special
needs. Precisely because they have not been identified as handi-
capped, these children are denied an appropriate public education
program.
The group of handicapped persons not identified by state
agencies is comprised of persons having handicapping conditions
of the same types as those categorizations described above;3 7 the
only difference is that they have not been officially recognized as
fitting into one of the designated categories. Hence, this second
group of handicapped persons is determinable; their membership
in the class of handicapped people can be determined by the diag-
noses of professionals in the fields of pyschology, medicine, and
§ 37-7-301 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-604(5) (1974); Orio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3317.06 (Page 1972).
32. See, e.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1011.3(h) (Supp. 1974); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 6802(e) (West 1975).
33. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-172a et seq. (1958). See, gener-
ally Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murdock]. Frequently, stat-
utes retain obsolete terminology, such as "idiots," "morons," "imbeciles" and "fee-
ble-minded" in referring to mental retardation. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
13-1 (1972).
34. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1011.3(g) (Supp. 1974); CAL.
Eouc. CODE § 6750 (West 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.504.2(6) (Vernon Supp.
1975). This category includes such impairments as dyslexia, developmental
aphasia, minimal brain dysfunction, and perceptual disabilities.
35. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 13.
36. See note 97 and accompanying text inIra.
37. See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.,
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education. If a person can be shown to meet the criteria for one
of the categories of recognized handicapping conditions, then that
individual is a "handicapped person," even if the state has not had
occasion to so identify that person.
II. A DISMAL HISTORY OF UNEQUAL TREATMENT
A. Overview: State Laws and Practices
A federal court in Michigan has described handicapped
persons as "a group that ranks among the state's most misfortuned
citizens.""8 Historical and present-day examples of this pattern of
discriminatory treatment afforded handicapped people are not diffi-
cult to find. The majority of American states either have, or did
have, statutes providing for the involuntary sterilization of men-
tally handicapped and certain physically handicapped citizens.3 9 A
current Mississippi statute, for instance, permits sterilization for
those "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recur-
rent, idiocy, imbicility, feeblemindedness, or epilepsy . ...
At one time in the late 1950's, 28 states had sterilization statutes,
and 17 of those laws specifically included persons with epilepsy,
as well as the mentally ill and mentally retarded. 41
Likewise, many states have statutory prohibitions on mar-
riages between handicapped persons. Most states proscribe
marriage where one of the parties is mentally ill or mentally re-
tarded,42 and some also limit the right of physically handicapped
people to marry.43 At least 17 states have had prohibitions
against marriage by persons with epilepsy. 4
A number of states restrict or deny the right of mentally
38. Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
39. See ThE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw ch. 6 (S. Brakel & R. Rook,
eds. 1971); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 917 (1974).
40. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 et seq. (1972).
41. Perr, supra note 26, at 290.
42. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STATS. ANN. § 402.020(1) (1970); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48-105 (1947). Nor have the courts always shown themselves indisposed
to enforce such prohibitions. A 1952 Kentucky decision, Beddow v. Beddow, 257
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. 1952), quoted with approval the language of an 1834 ruling,
Jenkins v. Jenkins' Heirs, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 102, 104 (1834), which declared:
A person "of unsound mind,"--an idiot, for example, is, as to all
intellectual purposes, dead; and such a being, destitute of intellectual
light and life, is as incapable as a dead body of being a husband or a
wife in a legal rational or moral sense. -
43. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-104 (1947), which provides that
a marriage is voidable at the option of a party to a marriage "[i]f either party
to a marriage be incapable from physical causes of entering into the marriage state
44. Perr, supra note 26, at 289.
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handicapped people to enter into contracts.4 5  For a lengthy
period in English and American jurisprudence, this contractual
prohibition was applied to "deaf mutes" as well, based upon
"[t]he old doctrine that a deaf mute was presumed to be
an idiot . . . .,4 Moreover, for a person who was deaf and
dumb and blind (as was Helen Keller), this presumption of inca-
pacity to contract was irrebutable, for such a person "would be
considered in law as incapable of any understanding, being
deficient in those inlets which furnish the human mind with
ideas."47
A blatant example of discrimination against handicapped
people is found in a federal statute outlining qualifications for ad-
mission of aliens to the United States. Title 8, section 1182 of
the United States Code provides that the following classes of aliens
(in addition to criminals, paupers, vagrants, professional beggars,
drug addicts, prostitutes, and polygamists) shall be excluded from
admission to the United States and shall be ineligible to receive
visas:
(1) Aliens who are mentally retarded;
(2) Aliens who are insane;
(3) Aliens who have had one or more attacks of insanity;
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual
deviation, or mental defect;
(7) Aliens not comprehended within any of the foregoing
classes who are certified ,by the examining surgeon as having
a physical defect, disease, or disability, when determined by
the consular or immigration officer to be of such nature that
it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless
the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not have to earn
a living ....
Moreover, a medical certificate issued by the examining physicians,
which states that a person has any such disability, is conclusive.4 8
The enforcement of these sections has blocked the entry into this
country of numerous persons afflicted with various types of physi-
cal and mental disabilities. 4"
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 43 (1958); CoLo. REv. STATS. ANN. § 71-
1-21 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-206 (1964); C.J.S. Contracts § 133(1) (1966).
46. Alexier v. Matzke, 151 Mich. 36, 115 N.W. 251 (1908). The court
stated that this doctrine no longer prevails and that "deaf-mutes" could enter into
contracts. See also Collins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 275, 282 (1883).
47. Brown v. Brown, 3 Conn. 299 (1821) (dictum).
48. United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1961);
United States ex rel. Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1950).
49. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 687(2d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Dunner v. Curran, 10 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 663 (1925) (fifteen-year-old son of an immigrant minister
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Handicapped persons are routinely denied other rights
which most members of our society take for granted, including the
right to vote,5° to obtain a driver's license"' or a hunting and fish-
ing license, 2 to enter the courts, 53 and to hold public office.
4
Often state laws and practices concerning handicapped
people can only be termed "bizarre." For many years, Wisconsin
had a statute which, in the interest of science, required the super-
intendents of state homes for the mentally retarded to authorize
exploratory brain surgery upon the corpses of residents of such
homes. 55
One collection of strange provisions which discriminate
against physically handicapped persons can best be described as
"ugly laws." Until recently, the Chicago Municipal Code pro-
vided:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way
deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or im-
proper person to be allowed in or on the public ways or oth-
er -public places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose
himself to public view, under a penalty of not less than one
dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each offense. 56
Columbus, Ohio,"7 Omaha, Nebraska,5" and other cities still have
was denied admission to United States because of a heart valve problem); United
States ex rel. Markin v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 647
(1926).
50. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 145 ("idiots and sane persons"); NEB. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2 (1875), as amended, art. VI, § 2 (1920) (persons who are "non compos
mentis"); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 10 (1961). For a case in which mentally
retarded plaintiffs successfully sued to secure their right to vote, see Carroll v.
Cobb, C.A. No. L-6585-74-P.W. (Super. Ct. Burlington County, N.J., Oct. 29,
1974). See also notes 335-40 and accompanying text infra.
51. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12805(c), (d) (West Supp. 1975); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4507.08(B), (C) (Page 1973). Nearly all states place restrictions
upon the driving rights of individuals with epilepsy. See Perr, supra note 26, at
292-96.
52. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-19 (1972).
53. See Sorkin, supra note 13, at 41.
54. See, e.g., In re Killeen, 121 Misc. 482, 201 N.Y.S. 209 (1923); where
the court held that an insane person was not eligible for public office, as a matter
of public policy, notwithstanding the fact that the court could perceive no constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law basis for Such a ruling.
55. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 52.04 (1930), as amended (1945) (repealed 1947)
provided in relevant part:
It shall be the duty of the superintendent of each home, whenever any
properly committed inmate of said home shall die, to cause an examina-
tion to be made in said home, by the physician in charge, upon the brain
of such inmate if in the judgment of said superintendent such post-
mortem examination may prove of benefit to scientific research and in-
vestigation.
56. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1974).
57. COLUMBUS, Omo, GEN. OFFENSE CODE § 2387.04 (1972).
..58. Unsightly -Beggar. Ordinance. OMAHR, NEB., MUN. CODE OF 1941 § 25
(1967).
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similar ordinances in effect. Lest it be thought that these are
merely "dead letter" laws, an Omaha police officer recently
arrested a man for violating such an ordinance.59
Employment is one area of particularly widespread discrimi-
nation against those with handicaps. Only a small percentage of
the handicapped Americans who could work if given the oppor-
tunity are actually employed.6 0 Transportation, physical barriers
and employers' prejudices have combined to deny the handi-
capped person access to many avenues of employment available
to other citizens."1 It is estimated that only one third of the blind
persons of working age in this country have jobs. 62 Only 47 per-
cent of the paraplegics (persons with loss of use or paralysis of
the lower half of the body on both sides) of working age are em-
ployed.6" Between 15 and 25 percent of working age persons
with epilepsy are employed.64 And only a handful of the persons
of working age with cerebral palsy have been able to secure
employment.65
These figures are dismal indeed when one considers that the
majority of unemployed handicapped persons, if given the chance,
are quite capable of taking their places in the job market. 6  In
fact, numerous studies indicate that the handicapped worker,
when assigned an appropriate position, performs as well as or
better than his non-handicapped fellow workers.6 Yet employers
continue to discriminate against handicapped job applicants be-
cause of stereotypes, prejudices, and misconceptions. 8
Denial of employment opportunities is especially outrageous
in regard to handicapped veterans. While the unemployment rate
for Vietnam era veterans at the end of 1971 was estimated at 8.8
percent, 87.7 percent of handicapped veterans were unable to findjobs. The disabled Vietnam veteran "seeks employment and is
rebuffed either by the private employer as incompetent, or by his
59. Omaha World Herald, Apr. 21, 1974, § B, at 1. (am. ed.) ("'41 Begging
Law Punishes Only the Ugly").
60. Note, Abroad In the Land, mpra note 13, at 1512. See also notes 62-
66 and accompanying text infra.
61. Note, Abroad in the Land, supra note 13, at 1513.
62. 118 CONO. REc. 3321 (1972).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. id.
66. Id. at 3320. It is estimated that nine out of ten mentally retarded persons
could work if given proper training and opportunities. Id.
67. Note, Abroad in the Land, supra note 13, at 1513.68. Id. One common misconception is that hiring handicapped workers ma
cause an increase in workmen's compensation insurance rates. Statistics indicatethat handicapped persons have eight percent fewer accidents than non-handi-dapped workers, so the hiring of handiepped employees, may actually decrease
the ivsrance rates. Id. at 1513; ntes 79-81 and accompanying text infra.
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Government as being essentially unplaceable."69
An additional problem is that those handicapped persons who
do manage to find employment tend to be channeled into un-
skilled, low paying positions involving monotonous tasks.
70
Transportation is another major area of current discrimina-
tion against individuals with handicaps. In our mobile society,
handicapped people are all too frequently denied access to public
transportation. 71
The Air Traffic Conference, the trade association for air
carriers, has promulgated the following rule concerning service to
handicapped passengers by member airlines: "Persons who have
malodorous conditions, gross disfigurement, or other unpleasant
characteristics so unusual as to offend fellow passengers should
not be transported by any member. '72 Who determines what is
"unpleasant," "unusual" or offensive to fellow passengers? Such
vagueness permits airlines to effect policies of discrimination
toward handicapped persons. For example, one airline will not
allow an unaccompanied blind person to sit next to a person of
the opposite sex; another refuses to accept persons with epilepsy
as passengers; at least seven airlines refuse service to mentally ill
passengers; and one airline expressly excludes mentally retarded
people from passenger service.7
Moreover, a Civil Aeronautics Board regulation 74 has been
interpreted by most airlines to require that an attendant accom-
pany all passengers in wheelchairs, whether or not these passen-
gers are capable of caring for themselves in flight.
75
Similar discriminatory practices occur in surface transporta-
tion systems:
Bus lines plead lack of trained personnel in helping the pas-
senger off and on the bus, and insist that the bus aisles are
too narrow for any sort of manipulation equipment. While
there is no evidence that their ruling is enforced to the letter
consistently, Greyhound has an official policy that. . . if an
individual cannot walk onto the bus on his own power he can-
not ride the bus.7 6
69. 118 CONo. RBc. 2998 (1972) (remarks of Congressman Vanik).
70. See, e.g., DIMINISHED PEOPLE: PROBLEMS AND CARE OF THE MErTALLY
RETARDED 32 (N. Bernstein ed. 1970).
71. 118 CONG. REc. 11362 (1972). See generally tenBroek, The Right to
Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841
(1966).
72. Am TRAFFIc CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, TRADE PRAC71CES MANUAL
(1962), quoted in 118 CONG. REc. 11363 (1972).
73. 118 CoNG. REc. 11363 (1972) (remarks of Congressman Vanik).
74. Specifically, Rule 15 of C.A.B. No. 142(2).
75. 118 cbNo. Rme 11362-63 (1972).
76. Id. at 11363.
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Railroads have also been guilty of unequal treatment of handi-
capped persons, particularly in requiring that a fare-paying attend-
ant accompany all passengers in wheelchairs, regardless of the
passenger's ability to fend for himself.77
Even where transportation agencies do not have active
policies which restrict the travel rights of handicapped passengers,
architectural impediments and physical obstacles may render use
of transportation facilities impossible for various groups of handi-
capped citizens. 7s  The "fundamental right to travel ' 79 has little
meaning if architectural barriers render a person unable to enter
buses, trains, planes or transportation terminals. 8°  New York
Judge Nathanial Sorkin, himself a handicapped person, has ob-
served:
The physically handicapped are de facto barred from using the
city's subways and to an only slighter degree from the city's
surface transportation system. They are not merely relegated
to the back of the bus, they are totally excluded.8'
Judge Sorkin summarized the plight of physically handi-
capped people in our society by naming such persons the most
discriminated minority in our nation. 2 Similarly, a Texas federal
court, quoting former American Bar Association President Chester-
field Smith, has observed:
The plight of the mentally disabled is among the saddest and
most alarming problems facing our society, and too little is
done to alleviate the effects of the problem. Traditionally
we have relegated persons suffering from mental disabilities
to deplorable institutions that have been inadequately staffed,
improperly managed, and have little regard for the constitu-
tional rights of those in the institution. The mentally disabled
have been the victims of widespread governmental com-
placency and outright neglect. This is outrageous. But,
worst of all, most of us have accepted it without protest.83
77. Id.
78. Note, Abroad in the Land, supra. note 13, at 1506. The author notes that
modern technology and effective planning can entirely eliminate such obstacles.
Id. at 1506 n.4 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969);, Note, The Right to Travel-Quest for a Constitutional
Source, 6 RUTGERS CAMDE;N L.J. 122 (1974).
80. Note, Abroad in the Land, supra note 13, at 1506 n.43 and accompanying
text.
81. See Sorkin, supra note 13, at 41.
82. Id.
83. Jenkins v. Cowley, 384 F. Supp. 441, 442 (N.D. Tex. 1974), quoting
Smith, New Hope for the Mentally Disabled, 60 A.B.A.J. 909 (1974). The court,however, denied as premature plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
against confinement in seclusion rooms, of a state hospital. 394 F. Supp. at 441.In a lawsuit involving mentally retarded chi.ldren, .a. Maryland. court .- expresslyfound that they had suffered a history of unequal treatment: .,"At various s,tages
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In some instances, discriminatory practices threaten the lives
of handicapped individuals. A number of situations have oc-
curred in which medical personnel or parents of handicapped chil-
dren have made no effort to provide handicapped patients with
lifesaving medical services which would be administered as a
matter of course to non-handicapped patients. 84  One widely pub-
licized instance involved a child afflicted with a form of mental
retardation called Down's Syndrome:
For 15 days-until he starved to death-the newborn infant
lay in a bassinet in a back corner of the nursery at the Johns
Hopkins University Hospital. A sign said, "Nothing by
mouth."
The baby's life could have been saved by a simple
operation to correct the intestinal blockage that kept him from
digesting any food.85
Many other cases involving both physically and mentally
handicapped infants who have been "allowed to die" have been
reported.8 6  One observer estimates that unnecessary deaths of
handicapped babies in the U.S. may number in the thousands each
year.8 7  Recently, advocates for handicapped infants have success-
fully challenged the legality of denying medical treatment to such
children,88 but the fact that such events occur in our "enlightened"
age, in a country which esteems life as an "inalienable" right, is
frightening evidence of the discriminatory and inequitable treat-
ment afforded handicapped people.
Two additional areas in which handicapped persons have
been subjected to particularly harsh unequal treatment are pub-
of history mentally retarded children have been isolated or segregated from the
general populuation. They have been subjected to discrimination." Mem., Apr.
6, 1974, at 5, Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland, Eq. No.
100/182/77676 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore Cpunty, Md., Apr. 6, 1974).
84. See, e.g., Murdock, supra notA 33, at 140-143.
85. Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1971, § A, at 1.
86. E.g., Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 N. ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972 § 6 (Magazine), at 44; Washington Post, Dec. 13,
1974, § A, at 1.
87. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1974, at 18, col. 4.
88. See, e.g., Order Relating to Protective Services, In re Baby Girl Ober-
nauer, (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris County, N.J., Dec. 22, 1970); Maine
Medical Center v. Houle, C.A. No. 74-145 (Super. Ct., Cumberland, Me., Feb.
14, 1974). The Houle court declared:
Quite literally the court must make a decision concerning the life or
death of a newborn infant. Recent decisions concerning the right of the
state to intervene with the medical and moral judgments of a prospective
parent and attending physician may have cast doubt upon the legal rights
of an unborn child; but at the moment of live birth there does exist a
human being entitled to the fullest protection of the law. The most
basic right enjoyed by every human being is the right to life itself,
Id' at3-4.
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lic education and residential care in state institutions. As a natural
consequence, there has been much litigation concerning the right
to equal educational opportunity and the state's duty to provide
treatment and residential programs in a manner that imposes the
least restriction on constitutional liberties. This article will now
examine in some detail the history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment of handicapped persons in relation to public education and
residential institutionalization.
B. Unequal Treatment of Handicapped Persons by Public
Educational Systems
Education for all has long been a cherished American ideal.
In 1846, American educator Horace Mann wrote:
I believe in the existence of a great, immortal, immutable
principle of natural law, or natural ethics,-a principle ante-
cedent of all human institutions, and incapable of being
abrogated by any ordinance of man . . . which proves the
absolute right to an education of every human being that
comes into the world, and which, of course, proves the cor-
relative duty of every government to see that the means of
that education are provided for all.89
This principle that education should be equally available to
all persons has been reflected in various facets of our legal system.
The constitutions of about one half of the states include provisions
that the public education system shall be equally available to all;90
constitutions of most of the remaining states declare that their
educational systems must be "general, uniform and thorough,"91
or "thorough and efficient." 2  These constitutional mandates for
education have been put into effect by specific legislation establish-
ing and controlling the state educational systems. All of the. 50
states have statutes authorizing and requiring the maintenance of
a system of free public educational programs, and all but one of
89. Mann, Tenth Annual Report to Massachusetts State Board of Education,in OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS V, No. 109, 177-80 (1846), quoted in W. Lucxo, READ-
INGS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 336 (1963), cited with approval in Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 619, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 626 (1971).
90. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1, which requires that the public schoolsbe "equally open to all"; Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 201, which states that public edu-
cation must be "for all children between the ages of 6 and 21 years"; N.D. CONST.
art. 8, § 147, which requires the "establishment and maintenance of a system ofpublic schools which shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota";
UTAH CONST. art. 10, § 1, which provides that the state public education system
shall be "open to all children of the state"; Wis. CONST. art. 10, § 3, which man-dates that the public schools "shall be free and without charge for tuition to all
children between the ages of 4 and 20 years."
91. See, e.g., IDA. CONST. art. 9, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 1.92. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. 8, § 1; OHIo CoNsr. art. b, § 2; PA. CONsT.
art. 3, § 14.
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the states make attendance at school compulsory for persons of
specified ages."
The concept of universal education has been widely recog-
nized by judicial tribunals; numerous courts across the land have
declared that opportunity for an education is a right which will
be jealously safeguarded.94 The classic statement of this attitude
appears in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education."5
The theoretical ideal of education for all, however, has
proved to be an empty promise for many persons with physical,
mental and emotional handicaps. Over the years, large numbers
of handicapped persons have been denied their right to equal edu-
cational opportunities and have been systematically excluded from
the public schools. Some observers estimate that there are
presently one million handicapped individuals of school age in this
country who are totally excluded from public educational pro-
grams.9 6 When one adds to this total the approximately three
million handicapped pupils attending the public schools but not
being provided with special education programs suited to their
needs,97 it is clear that unequal treatment of handicapped persons
by the state public education systems is a problem of gargantuan
proportions.
There is a certain irony in the denial of educational programs
to so many persons while school attendance remains compulsory.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments by
the State of Wisconsin in support of compelling Amish parents to
send their children to public high schools, despite their contrary
religious beliefs.98 At the same time, 89,583 handicapped Wis-
93. Mississippi is the only state which does not have a compulsory attendance
statute.
94. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971); Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1966); Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924);
Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730
(1901); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Anderson v.
Breithbarth, 62 N.D. 709, 245 N.W. 483 (1932).
95. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The majority opinion in Brown declared:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society .... It is the very
foundation of good citizenship . . . . In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity for an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
Id. (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handi-
capped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1037, 1038 (1972).
97. Id.
98. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-34 (1972).
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consin children were excluded from the public school system. 9
In order to understand the full scope of the denial of public edu-
cation to handicapped persons and the underlying reasons for this
absence of educational opportunities, it is necessary to examine
the historical development of public education and special educa-
tion programs in this country.
1. Special education-an historical perspective.
In early colonial America, education was generally a private'
concern, frequently taking place in the context of one's home and
family. There were a few formal institutions for schooling, but at
first these were privately controlled and served only the wealthier
colonists. It was not long, however, before the notion of public
education caught on, and by 1647, Massachusetts had developed
the first public school system in this country. 100 Other colonies
followed suit and educational institutions established or supported
by the colonial governments multiplied.
Teaching the "three R's" was the principal goal of early edu-
cation; there were no specialized programs or grade levels. Pupils
were taught only the basics of reading and mathematics, accom-
panied by rudimentary historical or geographical instruction.
Interestingly, the United States Constitution includes no
mention of schools or educational institutions. By implication, the
framers viewed public education as a matter better left to the in-
dividual states.' 0 ' In contrast, the constitutions of every one of
the 50 states contain provisions encouraging or establishing public
educational programs.10 2
The development of public school education from the 17th
century to the present is largely an evolution from the narrow con-
99. 118 CONG. Rnc. E 561 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1972) (remarks of Congress-
man Vanik). Panitch v. Wisconsin, 371 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1974), a state-
wide class action suit seeking equal educational opportunities for handicapped
children, was filed on August 14, 1972. The authors are involved in the lawsuit
as counsel for amicus curiae, the National Center for Law and the Handicapped.
A three-judge federal panel has agreed to oversee the prompt implementation of
Wisconsin's new mandatory special education legislation.
100. W. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 138 (1954),. cited in Manjares
v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 375, 411 P.2d 901, 908, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805, 812 (1966).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. X states:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, norprohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.
102. See, e.g., notes 90-92 supra. The California Constitution, for example,
provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to thepreservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement,
CAL. CONST. at. 9, § 1.
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cept of education as "reading, writing and arithmetic," to the
broader notion that education should encompass such diverse sub-
jects as chemistry, home economics, driver's training, foreign lan-
guages and gym classes. 103 Yet, the expanding scope of public
education did not benefit all groups of children. Educational pro-
grams for those persons with mental, emotional or physical
handicaps lagged far behind the significant advances made in
general educational programming. For many years, there were
no educational strategies at all for teaching persons with mental
handicaps. Educators had neither learned nor sought to learn the
techniques of educating such persons.
Initially, it became apparent that certain persons did not
make any significant educational progress within the "three 
R's"
curriculum. Rather than question the appropriateness of the
curriculum, the reaction of early American teachers and principals
was to label such persons as incapable of profiting from education.
Children who had been declared unable to profit from school-
ing were thenceforth excluded from attendance at school, and
from the compulsory attendance laws.'0
Moreover, those with physical handicaps were also effectively
excluded from the public school system. In the days when trans-
portation to school was on foot or by horseback, those with serious
physical disabilities understandably had tremendous difficulty in
just getting to the school house. In addition, the usual techniques
for teaching the "three R's" were not successful with persons who
were blind or deaf or could not use their hands. Any person who
deviated from the norms of what was expected of a pupil, and
thereby caused extra work for the teacher, was viewed as disrup-
103. An extensive discussion of the evolution of public education and a catalog
of significant judicial decisions in this area is contained in Dodge v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 298 Ky. 1, 181 S.W.2d 406 (1944). The Dodge court
observed:
As civilization has progressed, the ideas as to what constitutes, and the
necessities for, education has followed a liberal trend. It took some time
to pass from the custom, or duty placed on trustees to proclaim to par-
ents that they might send their children to school, notwithstanding they
themselves made no contribution toward paying expenses to compulsory
education. It was also a far cry from the teaching of three "R's" to
manual training, teaching of the arts, teaching of the evils attending the
use of alcoholic liquor, free text books, transportation of pupils, insur-
ance on school buses, teacher's pensions and higher standards. We are
yet a long way from perfection. The problem will be not absolutely
solved, for that would imply an absolute best education irrespective of
conditions but the practical solution will be reached only when a true
adjustment is made between the process of education and the life for
which that education is intended to be a preparation.
Id. at 3, 181 S.W.2d at 408 (citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 3208 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-
166 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.05 (1975); .ORE. REV. STAT. § 336-
090 (1947) (repealed 1965).
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tive and burdensome and thus not suited for classroom instruction.
As a result of either formal policy or informal practices, most
physically handicapped children did not attend the public
schools. 05
The result of this exclusion of handicapped children from thepublic schools was the removal of any incentive for educators to
develop programs suited to the needs of such children. Since the
teachers did not have to face the problems of teaching handi-
capped students, there was little reason for developing curricula
geared to their educational needs. Thus, the exclusion of handi-
capped children from the public school system greatly delayed thedevelopment of special education techniques, which, in turn, rein-
forced the "unable-to-be-educated" rationale for excluding them.
This tragic spiral accounts for the sad fact that for most of our
history handicapped persons had no place in American public
educational systems.
It was not until the 1860's that public school special
education classes for deaf children were initiated in this country,
and attempts to provide public school programs for mentally
retarded persons did not begin until about 1900.108 Actually,
many of the first special classes were intended primarily to assist
slow learners drawn from the population of immigrants to this
country. Such programs, known as "opportunity classes," were
intended to aid the non-English-speaking child in developing some
English language abilities and to prepare him or her for eventual
absorption into regular public school classes. Because their func-
tion was to prepare students to cope with the normal public school
programs, these special classes were also known as "vestibule
classes," indicating that the child was waiting to join the main-
stream school program.107
Eventually, these vestibule or opportunity classes evolved to
a point where they had almost directly reversed their function.
Instead of serving to prepare students for inclusion in regular
classes, they became the dumping grounds for many students who
could not fit into or manage to succeed in the normal class-
rooms. 108  In addition to those with language deficiencies, these
105. See, e.g., Record at 8, Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973)(direct testimony of expert, Dr. Gunnar Dybwad) [hereinafter Testimony of Dyb-
wad]; Rains, supra note 19, at 90-91.
106. Record at 10, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (testimony of expert, Ignacy Goldberg) [here-inafter cited as Testimony of Goldberg]; Weintraub, Recent Influences of Law
on the Identification and Placement of Children in Programs for the Mentally
Retarded, in 1 Focus ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN - (1972).
107. Testimony of Goldberg, supra note 106, at 10-11.
108. Id.
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programs came to include persons with perceptual and communica-
tion problems, slow learners, and persons with other mild mental
and physical handicaps.
The creation of this middle ground between regular class-
room programs and total exclusion was extremely important, for
it provided educators with the opportunity and incentive to
develop educational strategies to meet these students' special
needs. Given the impetus, education experts did find and begin
to implement such techniques.
Schooling for handicapped persons gradually became more
organized. The cities of Providence, Springfield, Boston and
Chicago initiated special classes for the mentally retarded shortly
before the turn of the century. In 1911, New Jersey became
the first state to legislate special education by statutorily authoriz-
ing classes for the mildly mentally retarded. 10 Formal classes for
mentally retarded children were introduced in other states in the
early 1920's.111 It is important to note, however, that these early
classes included only mentally retarded individuals who func-
tioned at a relatively high level of intelligence. Most of the chil-
dren placed in such classes were the "cream of the crop,"
functioning at a much higher educational level than students
assigned to special classes today."'
The successes of these special programs led educators to
divide mentally handicapped children into two groups. Those
who were showing progress when put into the special classes were
labeled "educable," and were increasingly included in state educa-
tion systems." 2  The remainder of the handicapped children, the
"uneducable," were deemed incapable of benefitting from school-
ing and continued to be excluded from the public schools. Cate-
gorization was frequently based upon scores on intelligence quo-
tient tests. 118 If a child's score was above a certain point, he or
she was "educable"; otherwise, the child was considered incapable
of learning.
This educable-uneducable dichotomy was threatened in the
mid-1920's when educators in St. Louis and New York City
developed successful educational programs for children with an
educational level below that which would have qualified them as
"educable.""11 4 Rather than admitting that they had been wrong
109. W. LIPPMAN & A. GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION 5 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG].
110. Testimony of Goldberg, supra note 106, at 14.
111. Id.
112. See generally id. at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 14.
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in declaring such persons incapable of benefitting from education,
educators responded by creating a new category: the "trainable."
Since the individuals had already been labeled uneducable, it was
decided to call new programs "training" rather than "education."
Those who were unable to profit from these training programs
were declared to be "sub-trainable." Thus a changing educa-
tional reality was glossed over with a vocabulary shift.
In 1930, the White House Conference on Children and
Youth adopted the educable-trainable distinction, and recom-
mended that classes be provided for both groups. These recom-
mendations were not immediately acted upon and classes for the
"trainable" mentally handicapped did not become widespread
until the 1950's. 11
In the early 1950's, California, later followed by other states,
began to require by statute that special public classes be provided
for certain groups of handicapped children, generally the mentally
retarded. 11 For the most part, however, special education pro-
grams remained "permissive" undertakings at the discretion of
local school officials.
The decades of the fifties and sixties were marked by an
expanding scope and variety of special education programs. The
number of school districts operating some type of special educa-
tion program was reported to be 1,500 in 1948, 3,600 in 1958,
and 5,600 in 1963. 11 Research and experimental teaching tech-
niques resulted in the development of new educational strategies.
Educators learned how to teach those with perceptual and com-
munication disorders; educational programs were developed for
emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped and autistic chil-
dren; and eventually it was found that educational techniques could
be devised for assisting even those mentally handicapped persons
who had been labeled "sub-trainable."
As the number and variety of special education programs
grew, it became possible to speak of "zero reject" education, a
concept that involves finding instruction techniques to suit the
needs and maximize the capabilities of every child."" In 1971,
the Council for Exceptional Children, the national organization of
special education teachers, supervisors and administrators, de-
clared its official position:
115. Id. at 15.
116. LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 109, at 6.117. Murdock, supra note 33, at 166 n.126, quoting Weintraub, Recent Influ-
ences of Law on the Identification and Placement of Children in Programs for
the Mentally Retarded, in 1 Focus ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN - (1972).118. See Lilly, Special Education: A Teapot in a Tempest, in 1970 EXCEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 43-49; LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 109, at 3.
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Education is the right of all children. The principle of educa-
tion for all is based on the philosophical premise of democracy
that every person is valuable in his own right and should be
afforded equal opportunities to develop his full potential.119
But while special education programs have grown both in
number and in quality, and while lipservice is paid to the idea
of education for all, "zero reject" education has remained an un-
fulfilled promise for large numbers of handicapped citizens.
Implementation of novel educational strategies has been slow and
spotty. The education profession, despite numerous conferences,
publications, conventions, workshops and seminars, has not de-
veloped an effective method for the universal sharing of informa-
tion and techniques. Thus, a successful educational program
designed to meet the needs of children with a particular type of
handicap may be developed in one locale, while in other areas
of the country (or even of the same state) similar children find
their educational needs unmet.
In spite of progress and important breakthroughs in the last
two decades, the public education systems in this country are still
a very long way from providing equal educational opportunities
for all handicapped children. Even today, the picture painted by
statistics on special education programs is dismal. There are
approximately seven million handicapped children of school age
in this country who need special education programs. 120 Of this
total, approximately 17 percent, or one million children, are
receiving no formal education at all: they are totally excluded
from the public schools.' 2 ' Of the six million handicapped chil-
dren who are attending the public schools, it is estimated that 3.3
million are receiving special educational services.' 22  This leaves
2.7 million handicapped children who are attending the public
schools but are not provided with special education programs.
Combining this figure with those totally excluded from school, the
result is that 3.7 million handicapped children in this country-
53 percent of all such children-need public special education
services but do not receive them.
119. Basic Commitments and Responsibilities to Exceptional Children, adopted,
Council for Exceptional Children Delegate Convention, Apr. 1971, in 1971 Ex-
CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 181-87.
120. See Macroff, Hope Rises on Education of Handicapped Students, New
York Times, Apr. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1-2, citing figures provided by the Council
for Exceptional Children and the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped,
United States Office of Education.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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2. The courts and the denial of educational opportunities.
The new wave of litigation. With more than half the
handicapped children of school age not receiving the educational
programs they need in a country which holds as a fundamental
principle the right of education for all, it is hardly surprising that
in the 1970's handicapped individuals have turned to the courts
in an effort to obtain their rightful access to the public education
system. The litigation of the 70's was presaged in 1969 by Wolf
v. Legislature of the State of Utah,2 ' a case dealing with denial
of admission to the public school system to two so-called "train-
able" mentally retarded children. Judge D. Frank Wilkens
ordered the children admitted to the public schools, declaring:
Education today is probably the most important function of
state and local government. It is a fundamental and inalien-
able right and must be so if the rights guaranteed to an
individual under Utah's Constitution and the 'U.S. Constitu-
tion are to have any real meaning. Education enables the
individual to exercise those rights guaranteed him by the
Constitution of the United States of America.
Today it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the right and
opportunity of an education.' 24
Resort to legal action to obtain equal educational opportuni-
ties for handicapped children resulted from the conjunction of
three factors: school desegregration lawsuits, a shift in profes-
sional attitudes toward handicapped people, and the emergence
of advocates for them. The legal basis for the movement was estab-
lished by the education lawsuits which had been a major part of the
civil rights struggle waged by racial minorities. Particularly promis-
ing was the language of the United States Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms.' 25
The major factual consideration underlying the successful
lawsuits seeking education for handicapped children was the
development of a comprehensive body of professional expertise
supporting the premise that all handicapped persons can learn,
develop and benefit from appropriate educational programs: the
"zero reject" concept. Without such evidence of the ability of
123. Civil No. 182646 (3d Judicial Dist. Ct., Utah, Jan. 8, 1969).
124. id.
125. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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handicapped children to benefit from education, many of the
important lawsuits in this area would have been impossible.126
The third major impetus for equal education litigation on
behalf of handicapped children has been the emergence of strong
and active advocacy groups concerned with the plight and rights
of handicapped persons. Professional, consumer, and parent
organizations have been created on both local and national levels,
and many of these agencies have become effective champions for
those with various types of handicaps.' 27 As these organizations
have become increasingly sophisticated, they have evolved from
loose volunteer groups seeking charity for handicapped individuals
to well-organized entities with full-time paid staffs advocating and
often demanding that persons with handicaps be afforded their
full legal and human rights.
128
Class action litigation on behalf of handicapped persons
began early in the present decade, and in 1971 a consent order
was entered in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania129 which guaranteed educational
programs for all of Pennsylvania's mentally retarded children.
Shortly thereafter, two individual actions in New York resulted in
orders directing that publicly funded educational programs be pro-
vided for an autistic child 8 ° and a physically handicapped child.' 81
In 1972, a decision was entered in Mills v. Board of Educa-
tion of the District of Columbia,'l 2 a class action suit brought on
behalf of all handicapped children of school age in the District
of Columbia. The court found that, based on "the equal protec-
tion clause in its application to public school education,"'1 8 the
plaintiffs had a constitutional right to "equal education opportun-
ity."'1 4 The court ordered the District of Columbia to provide to
126. Gilhool, The Right to Access to Free Public Schooling for all Children,
in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CoURT, 2 LEADERSHIP SmEs IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 167,
169 (1973). For a discussion of the "zero reject education" concept, see sources
cited note 118 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Dybwad, A Look at History and Present Trends in the Protec-
tion of Children's Right to Education, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN COURT, 2 LEADER-
sunP SmuEs IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 152, 156 (1973).
128. For example, the Fourth Congress of the International League of Socie-
ties for the Mentally Handicapped in 1967 had as its theme "From Charity to
Rights." Id. at 155.
129. 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
130. See In re Leitner, 40 App. Div. 2d 38, 337 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1972); In re
Leitner, 38 App. Div. 2d 554, 328 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1971).
131. In re Held, Nos. H-2-72 & H-10-71 (Family Ct., Westchester County,
New York, Nov. 29, 1971).
132. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
133. Id. at 875 (paraphrasing a quotation from opinion of Wright, J., in Hob-
sen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)).
134. 348 F. Supp. at 875.
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each child of school age "a free and suitable publicly-supported
education regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical,
or emotional disability or impairment."' 35
The successful results in Wolf, P.A.R.C., Mills, and the New
York cases ,have spawned a plethora of similar actions across the
nation.13 6 The complaints filed in these actions have sought to
secure rights under state constitutions, statutes and regulations as
well as under the United States Constitution. The decision in In
re G. H. 1 7 exemplified the reasoning in such cases; the Supreme
Court of North Dakota declared:
When North Dakota undertakes to supply an education to all,
and to require all to attend school, that right must be made
available to all, including the handicapped, on equal terms.13 8
The G.H. court held that a handicapped child was entitled
to equal educational opportunity under the state constitution. "9
Deprivation of that opportunity, the court concluded, was a denial
of equal protection under both the federal and the state constitu-
tions; 140 it also contravened the due process and the privileges and
immunities clauses of the North Dakota Constitution.'
A prime example of the many legal actions aimed at enforc-
135. Id. at 878.
136. Kivell v. Ne Moitin, Civil No. 143913 (Super. Ct., Fairfield City, Conn.,
July 8, 1972); Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland, Eq. No.
100/182/77676 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md., May 3, 1974); In re K, 74 Misc.
2d 872, 347 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Family Ct. 1973); In re Kirschner, 74 Misc. 2d 20,
344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1973); In re Apple, 73 Misc. 2d 553, 296 N.E.2d
251, 343 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Family Ct. 1973); In re H., 72 Misc. 2d 59, 337 N.Y.S.2d
969 (Family Ct. 1972); In re Reid, No. 3742 (N.Y. Comm'r of Educ., Nov. 26,
1973); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); Rainey v. Tennessee Dep't of
Educ., No. A-3100 (Ch., Davidson County, Tenn., July 29, 1974); see Lebanks
v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973); Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp.
846 (E.D. Mich. 1972); In re Borland, 72 Misc. 2d 723, 342 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Fam-
ily Ct. 1973); Pacyna v. Bd. of Educ., 57 Wis. 2d 562, 204 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
Many other cases are still pending.
The broadening scope of such litigative activity was described recently in the
Congressional Record:
[A] number of complaints have been brought throughout the nation to
require that educational services be made available to all children, in-
cluding the physically and mentally handicapped. There have been 36
court cases in 24 states on the right to education for all handicapped
children . . . In those cases which have been decided, judgments havebeen given-as they should be-in favor of the handicapped children
and their parents.
120 CoNG. REC. 4212-4313 (daily ed. May 21, 1974) (remarks of Congressman
Vanik). Today, such lawsuits, either completed or pending, number more than
fifty.
137. 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); see notes 350-53 and accompanying text
inf ra.
138. 218 N.W.2d at 447.
139. Id., construing N.D. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 20.
140. 218 N.W.2d at 447.
141. Id.
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ing state statutory guarantees with regard to educational programs
was Rainey v. Tennessee Department of Education.142  Tennes-
see had enacted comprehensive special education legislation,' 43
but the implementation was proceeding slowly and had lagged be-
hind the timetable specified in the statute. The filing of the law-
suit resulted in a consent decree aimed at providing educational
programs for all handicapped children as soon as possible.'4
Both the number and the successes of lawsuits seeking equal
educational opportunities for handicapped persons are impressive.
The lawsuits, however, may also be viewed as catalogues of the
many different ways in which handicapped persons have been de-
nied equal access to the public school system. Each successful
case attests to the fact that handicapped persons were indeed ex-
cluded from -appropriate educational programs. Sadly, the dis-
criminatory practices struck down as unlawful in one legal action
frequently continue in other jurisdictions.
Exclusionary mechanisms. The "mechanisms of exclu-
sion"-the methods, processes, excuses and practices by which
handicapped persons have been denied equality in access to pub-
lic school education programs-are many. Some such mech-
anisms, documented in recent case law, include:
(1) "Educable," "trainable," and "sub-trainable" categor-
ization. Such classifications usually involve an implication that
only those labeled "educable" are entitled to education programs.
This practice has been struck down in a number of cases,' 4 ' but
perhaps most emphatically by a Maryland court in Maryland
Association for Retarded Children v. State of Maryland.'46 The
Court held that there was no distinction between the words "train-
ing" and "education," and added:
A child may be trained to read or write, or may be educated
142. No. A-3 100 (Ch., Davidson County, Tenn., July 29, 1974).
143. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2912 to 49-2959 (Supp. 1974).
144. Rainey v. Tennessee Dept. of Dep't of Educ., No. A-3100 (Chi, Davidson
County, Tenn., July 29, 1974), at 2. The consent decree declared:
All children can benefit from an appropriate education program and
have a legal and moral right to a free public education. Tennessee's
Mandatory Education Law is based upon these two premises and guaran-
tees an equal educational opportunity to all handicapped children no
later than the beginning of the school year 1974-75.
The order detailed specific steps which Tennessee was required to take to in-
sure rapid provision of educational services to all handicapped children. Id. at
7.
'145. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279 (1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Rainey v. Tennessee
Dep't of Educ., No. A-3100 (Ch., Davidson County, July 29, 1974). See also
Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972).
146. Mem., Apr. 9, 1974, Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland,
Eq. No. 100/182/77676 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md., Apr. 6, 1974).
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to read and write. A child may be educated to tie his shoes
or trained to tie his shoes. Every type of training is at least
a sub-category of education. 147
(2) Administrative buckpassing. This is the practice of
having unclear or shared responsibility for providing education
programs to certain groups of children. As a result, some children
"fall through the holes in the net" and are not served by any pub-
lic education agency. Such a situation, where a number of school
districts or state education agencies bicker about which of them
should be providing education to certain individuals, was the source
of the controversy in In re G.H.'48 This issue of administrative
responsibility for education programs was also dealt with in Mills,
where the court declared:
The lack of communication and cooperation between the
Board of Education and the other defendants in this action
shall not be permitted to deprive plaintiffs and their class of
publicly supported education. 149
The Mills court ruled that the responsibility for providing educa-
tion to all of the children residing in the District of Columbia
rested with the Board of Education. 150
(3) Waiting lists. This is the practice of refusing to furnish
immediate educational programs for certain children and, instead,
placing their names on a waiting list of persons who will be
eligible for a placement if and when a program becomes available.
The use of waiting lists has been successfully challenged in Doe v.
Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee",' and in In
re Reid.152
(4) Lagging implementation. Of major concern are re-
peated failures by public agencies to provide educational services
according to timetables specified in state legislation. This prob-
lem was dealt with in the Rainey, 5 ' Maryland Association for
Retarded Children,"' and Reid155 cases. The courts ordered
prompt provision of educational programs in accord with statutory
requirements.
147. Id. at 4-5.
148. 218 N.W.2d 441, 443-45 (N.D. 1974).
149. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
150. Id.
151. No. 37770 (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County, Wis., Mar. 30, 1972).
152. No. 8742 (N.Y. Comm'r of Educ., Nov. 26, 1973).
153. No. A-3100 (Ch., Davidson County, Tenn., July 29, 1974); see notes
142-44 and accompanying text supra.
154. Mem., Apr. 9, 1974, at 4-5, Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Maryland, Eq. No. 100/182/77676 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, Md., Apr. 6,
1974); see notes 146-47 and accompanying text supra.
155. No. 8742 (N.Y. Comm'r of Educ., Nov. 26, 1973).
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(5) Insufficient funds. The excuse that programs for
handicapped children are too expensive was explicitly rejected in
Mills.15 6 The court, balancing the District of Columbia's compet-
ing interests in educating the excluded children and in preserving
its financial resources, held that the former plainly outweighed the
latter. If available funds were insufficient to finance all of the
system's needed services and programs, then each program and
service would have to sustain some cutbacks so that no one phase
of the system would be choked off entirely."5 7 "The available
funds," the court ruled, "must be expended equitably in such a
manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly sup-
ported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit
therefrom." 158 The court refused to allow the inadequacies of the
public school system, whether occasioned by insufficient funding
or administrative inefficiency, to bear more heavily on the "excep-
tional" or handicapped child than on the normal child. 15 9
(6) Exclusion, placement or transfer without the opportun-
ity to be heard. Due process rights to notice and a hearing prior
to any placement, denial of placement, or transfer to a special edu-
cation class have been upheld in a number of cases. 160
(7) Residency problems. In many cases, it is difficult to
determine the school district in which a child resides; for example,
the parents may have moved out of state, or the child may be in
a residential institution located in a district different from that in
which his parents reside. Frequently, the handicapped child will
be denied educational services in both districts. This issue has been
considered and resolved in In re G.H.'6' and in Michigan Asso-
ciation for Retarded Citizens v. State Board of Education of the
State of Michigan.16 2
156. 348 F. Supp. at 866, 876; see notes 131-35 and accompanying text supra.
157. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. This is the concept of "procedural due process" as applied to state civil
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment and to federal proceedings via the
fifth amendment. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
Cases which have held procedural due process applicable to special education
program placements include the following: Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of District of
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying
334 F. Supp. 1257 (1971) (holding that the federal district court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter because plaintiffs had raised "colorable claim" under the
due process clause); Marlega v. Bd. of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee,
Civil No. 70-C-8 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 17, 1970).
161. 218 N.W.2d 441, 447-48. The court ruled that where the parents had
moved out of state, the school district in which he actually resided was responsible
for the cost of his education.
162. No. G-74-385 C.A.5 (W.D. Mich., filed Oct. 30, 1974). The defendant
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(8) Partial public funding and tuition reimbursement ceil-
ings. In certain instances where public schools choose not to
provide directly a specific educational program, contractual
arrangements and tuition reimbursement plans are developed
whereby the public school system pays for a program provided in
a private school. However, some states impose an arbitrary limit
upon such payments, which may or may not be sufficient to cover
the costs of the special education program for a particular child.
In such situations, if the parents are unable to make up the dif-
ference, the child will receive no education. This practice has
been challenge in In re Downey,16 In re K.,' 64 Halderman v. Pit-
tenger, 65 and In re Kirschner.66  The judicial attitude in these
cases is typified by the holding in Downey:
To order a parent to contribute to the education of his handi-
capped child when free education is supplied to all other chil-
dren would be a denial of the constitutional right of equal
protection.' 67
(9) Misclassification. This occurs in the inappropriate
labeling, classifying, and placement of children with regard to
special education programs. Culturally biased tests, improper
labeling, and inappropriate educational programs have been chal-
lenged in Larry P. v. Riles,168 Diana v. State Board of Educa-
tion, '6 and Rhode Island Society for Autistic Children v. Reis-
man.
170
(10) Education for those in residential institutions. Fre-
quently the public school systems have failed to provide educa-
tional programs for residents of state institutions upon the theory
that some other agency is responsible for serving these individuals.
In fact, many residents of state institutions receive no education
at all. The failure of the state education agency to provide educa-
public school officials agreed to issue regulations to the effect that residence for
educational purposes of a child in a residential institution is in the school district
in which the child resided before coming to the institution.
163. 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1973).
164. 74 Misc. 2d 872, 347 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1973).
165. 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiffs' claims of denial of equal
protection held "sufficiently substantial to require the convening of a 3-judge
court").
166. 74 Misc. 2d 20, 344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1973).
167. 72 Misc. 2d 772, 774; 340 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690, citing U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1.
168. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court invalidated culturally biased testing procedures.
169. No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970). The parties agreed to a
stipulation that culturally biased evaluation techniques would be discontinued.
170. C.A. No. 5081 (D.R.I., filed Dec. 1972). This action challenging the
appropriateness of various educational programs for handicapped children in
Rhode Island is still pending. Pretrial negotiations are underway.
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tion programs for the residents of state institutions for the mentally
retarded has been successfully attacked in Michigan Association
for Retarded Citizens v. State Board of Education of the State of
Michigan.171
Through these and other methods, the state public education
systems have neglected a large number of handicapped children.
While the courts have been receptive to the right of handicapped
children to equal educational opportunity, 172 and while the avail-
ability of special education services has significantly increased in
various states, the situation at the present time is still intolerable.
In a nation which prides itself on having the highest standard of
living in the world, and where education is valued as "perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments,"' 78
it is unacceptable that more than half the handicapped children of
school age are being denied appropriate educational programs.
Both currently and historically, the unequal treatment afforded
handicapped persons by state public education systems is probably
unmatched by similar discrimination against any other minority
group.
C. Unequal Treatment of Handicapped Persons Through Institu-
tionalization
From considering the denial to many handicapped citizens
of the right to equal educational opportunity, we turn now to
another type of unequal treatment: residential institutionalization,
society's practice of confining handicapped individuals.
1. Institutionalization: historical background.
Institutionalization is an outgrowth of the historical pattern
of segregating those people who are different from the "normal"
population. Records of ancient societies reveal that handicapped
people were often segregated in such a way as to limit severely
their chances for survival. 174  In Sparta, around 800 B.C., men-
tally and physically defective children were left on mountainsides
171. No. G-74-385 C.A. 5 (W.D. Mich., filed Oct. 30, 1974). Shortly after
the filing of this action, the defendants agreed to provide educational programs
for residents of state institutions.
172. The outlook for such litigation should be even better in the future. A
section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1975), condemns
discrimination against handicapped persons in any program (including the public
schools) receiving federal financial assistance. Violation of this statute has been
included as an additional cause of action in most of the recently filed equal educa-
tional opportunity lawsuits.
173. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
174. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION, Special Education: History 341 (1971).
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or in pits to fend for themselves. Even enlightened Athenians
put deaf children to death, and the practice of exposing such chil-
dren reportedly had the approval of Plato and Aristotle." 5
These inhumane and discriminatory practices continued
through the Middle Ages. 70 When persons with physical or
mental disabilities were not imprisoned, they were driven from the
cities'7 7 to wander aimlessly through rural areas.'7 1 Western
society for the most part has refused to treat handicapped persons
differently from criminals, drunkards or slaves.17 9 Prisons have, in
the past, confined hardcore criminals with handicapped persons
whose only crime was their inability to support themselves. 8 °
One of the reasons that such horrendous treatment was
visited upon handicapped people was that physical and mental im-
pairments were thought to be supernatural in origin. Some
viewed handicapped individuals as the children of God,18" ' but
more often a disability was linked to demoniacal powers. Many
of these superstitions were rooted in religious beliefs.'
175. 1 SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR THE EXCEPTIONAL 5 (M. Frampton & E. Gall
eds. 1955).
176. See N. KITRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 57 (1971).
177. Id.
178. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR
CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 25 (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited
as DEUTSCHl.
179. N. KiTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 57 (1971).
180. Id. at 57-58.
181. S. DAVIES, THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT IN SOCIETY 9 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIES].
182. Deuteronomy 28:28 reads, "The Lord shall smite thee with madness
.The New Testament reveals how Christ worked cures by casting out de-
mons from a "dumb demonic." Matthew 9:32. The medieval mind was puzzled
by mental instability.
There remained the question of what supernatural influences were
involved . . . . [Tihe influence might be of divine origin and the in-
spired one therefore a superior person or even a saint. But the ravings
of many persons suggested a more sinister background. Such individuals
might be "possessed" of a devil, or in communion with Satan himself.
Since Christian theology stressed the freedom of the human will, it was
assumed witches or wizards who had abandoned themselves to these evil
contacts had done so of their own consent and were therefore deserving
of the most severe punishment.
Shryock, The Beginnings: From Colonial Days to the Foundation of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY
1, 4 (J. Hall ed. 1944) [hereinafter cited as The Beginnings].
Calvin and Luther, leaders of the Reformation, referred to the mentally af-
flicted as "filled with Satan." DAVIES, supra note 181, at 10. The basic theolog-
ical attitude was that the mentally disabled were dangerously inferior and not de-
serving of Christian charity. The Beginnings, supra at 5.
The witchcraft mania which gripped Europe and ultimately the New England
region of the United States can be directly traced to superstitious notions about
mental disorders. The practices of abandonment and ostracism gave way during
this period to torture and persecution.
Demonical possession was the common explanation of most forms of
mental disorder, and the scourge, the rack, the stake and the gallows were
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The biases against handicapped persons which existed in
Europe were transmitted to colonial America. Although many
handicapped persons from well-to-do families were cared for out
of concern for the preservation of the individual's property, 8' the
general attitude at this time was repressive, with the usual methods
of "treatment" being confinement or banishment.'8
4
Individuals not considered dangerous were treated as minor
criminals. A common practice was to warn any such person to
leave town if there was a chance that he or she might become
a public charge.' 5 The individual who chose to return faced cor-
poral punishment. For example, a 1721 New York law provided
for "36 lashes on the bare back of a man and 25 if a woman."18 6
Another practice during the colonial period was to kidnap "feeble-
minded" and insane persons during the night and leave them on
the outskirts of strange towns in the hope that their inability to
communicate would effectively preclude a return to their home
towns.
1 8 7
Confinement was the general rule for the violently insane.
The mentally disabled person prone to violent behavior was placed
in prison' and subjected to physical and mental tortures.' 8 9 It
was commonly believed that the insane were oblivious to their
physical environment; consequently, one form of mistreatment was
to abandon them outside naked in the winter snow)9°
Basically, local officials were free to select the most expe-
dient way to deal with handicapped individuals, and little or no
thought was given to the interest of the person involved.' 9' This
philosophy was evidenced by the almshouse (poorhouse) system
that sprang up in this country around 1800. By 1830, almost all
states encouraged or mandated'92 the establishment of an alms-
house, which housed the destitute as well as the sick and "insane."
Conditions in these poorhouses were little better than in the prisons.
By 1843, a very few handicapped people were placed in
the common methods of treatment.
DEUTSCH, supra note 178, at 24-25. Unfortunately, these prejudices colored
society's attitude long after the superstitious bases were proven false.
183. See DEUTSCH, supra note 178, at 40.
184. Id. at 41-45.
185. Id. at 44.
186. Id. at 45.
187. Id. at 45, 123-25.
188. Id. at 41.
189. Id. at 55-56, quoting J. CONOLLY, TREATMENT OF THE INSANE WITHOUT
MECHANICAL RESTRAINTS 4 (London 1856) (describing conditions in English jails
and almshouses).
190. Id. at 83-84.
191. ld. at 39-54.
192. Id. at 129.
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private or state asylums. 198 The vast majority of handicapped per-
sons, however, were confined in homes, almshouses and jails,
under the most despicable conditions.' 4 The common denomina-
,tor inherent in the various forms of incarceration in early
America-prison, almshouse or asylum-was total exclusion of
the disabled person from society. In reality, confinement was a
preventive detention measure for the benefit of society. There
was no thought given to providing any kind of treatment program
for the individual.' 95
A significant change in society's attitudes toward the handi-
capped person and his treatment was brought about through the
efforts of Dorothea Dix. Appalled by the horrible conditions of
institutional confinement, Miss Dix crusaded for improvement.
As a result of her efforts, the next 40 years saw the building of
new mental hospitals and the improvement of existing ones.
Approximately 20 states and the District of Columbia joined the
movement. 96
Limited reforms were undertaken throughout the early 19th
century.' 7 Although the building of new institutions improved the
lot of confined persons, what originated as a progressive ideal be-
came rigid and anachronistic with the passing of time. The custo-
dial concept-simply providing food, clothing, and shelter-be-
came dominant. All too often the motivation was philanthropic
rather than scientific,' 98 and this sentimental humanitarianism re-
sulted in an unproductive stasis. 99 The institution began to be con-
ceived of as an end in itself, a universal solution to the problem
of dealing with mentally and physically handicapped persons.2"'
Construction of institutions took precedence over any concern for
operating them according to scientific or medical principles:
The problem of organization, administration and methods
of therapy were, as a rule, considered to be of relatively
small consequence in mental hospitals; the important thing
was to build them. It didn't matter that some of the special
hospitals and asylums were hardly better than the almshouses
and jails where -the insane had formerly been confined-the
very change in nomenclature seemed to possess a magic
potency in itself.20 1
193. The Beginnings, supra note 182, at 24-25.
1.94. Id. at 25; DEtJTSCH, supra note 178, at 130.
195. DETTSCH, supra note 178, at 130-31.
196. Id. at 184.
197. Id. at 188. See generally id. at 55-113, 132-158.
198. Id. at 188-91.
199. Id. at 186.
200. Id. at 187-88.
201. Id. at 187-88.
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Disillusionment soon replaced the optimistic assumption that
handicapped people were curable if confined. Demands for
bigger and better institutions only increased public apprehension
about the "mentally diseased," and this apprehension, given added
impetus by the discoveries of Mendel and Darwin, brought a
dramatic change in public attitudes.
The philanthropic movement of Dorothea Dix and her fol-
lowers was based on sympathetic understanding; but the Darwian
philosophy of "survival of the fittest" fostered contempt and hos-
tility toward the handicapped citizen.202 Eugenic propaganda
spread with the swiftness of fanaticism and even sophisticated
thinkers fell prey to its simplicity. 203 All social evils were the
product of heredity, and "insanity" as well as "feeblemindedness"
was a threat to the normal population. Mentally defective persons
were inaccurately thought to be more promiscuous and therefore
more prolific; eventually they would outnumber the rest of the
population.2 °4
Society responded by calling for measures even more drastic
than the traditional methods of banishment and confinement. In
1911 the American Breeders' Association reviewed possible
means to "purge from the blood of the race the innately defective
strains."20 5 Some of the suggested alternatives included the follow-
ing: euthanasia, selective scientific breeding to remove defec-
tive traits, restrictive marriage laws, sterilization, and life segrega-
tion for all handicapped persons.20 6  Americans preferred to con-
centrate their efforts on the last three alternatives. Restrictive
marriage laws were passed, but it soon became apparent that the
"unfit reproduce their kind regardless of marriage laws. ' 20 7  Steri-
lization was then emphasized as a reasonable alternative; it was
even rationalized as being in the "best interests" of the individ-
ual. 20  Laws were passed making sterilization of physically and
202. See id. at 353.
203. Modem writers refer to this philosophy as a "social indictment" of the
handicapped. DAVIES, supra note 181, at 42; Wolfensberger, The Origin and Na-
ture of Our Institutional Models, in CHANGING PATrERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 59, 101 (R. Kugel &.W. Wolfensberger eds. 1969)
(comp. for President's Committee on Mental Retardation) [hereinafter cited as
Wolfensberger]. For discussion of the attitudes, see DAVIES, supra note 181, at
42-48; DEUTSCH, supra note 178, at 354-373; Wolfensberger, supra at 100-112.
204. DEUTSCH, supra note 178, at 353.
205. L. KANNER, A HISTORY OF THE CARE AND STUDY OF THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED 135 (1969).
206. DAVIES, supra note 181, at 50. See discussion in Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
207. Murdock, State Care for the Feeble-Minded, 18 J. PSYCHO-ASTHE-ICrCs
35, 37-38 (1913).
208. Barr, The Imperative Call of Our President to Our Future, 7 J. PsYcHO-
ASTIENTiCS 5, 7 (1902).
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mentally defective persons2 °9 compulsory; unfortunately, some
courts upheld such dehumanizing treatment of handicapped
people.2 10 For various reasons, restrictions on the right to pro-
create were eventually perceived to be impractical."1 Preventive
segregation thereafter came to be considered the most acceptable
means of controlling handicapped people.21 2
At the beginning of the 20th century, institutions were used
to segregate all types of handicapped persons from the mainstream
of society. Although it was claimed that mass institutionalization
was for the individual's benefit, it was clear from the tenor of the
times that the true motivation was protection of society from the
handicapped. 21 1 National audiences were told that "evervy effort
must be made to get these defectives out of society, 21 4 and that
"the righteous have sworn the segregation of all the feeble-
minded. 2 5  Not only were handicapped individuals separated
from society, but the sexes were separated from each other, some-
times in separate institutions. Serious proposals were developed
for confining all mentally handicapped Americans in one national
institution or reservation-a method adopted for another minority
group, the American Indian.216  Furthermore, the practice of
permissive institutionalization gave way to compulsory commit-
ments. These quasi-permanent commitments spawned many of
our current commitment laws.217
The attempt to institutionalize all mentally handicapped
persons was not totally successful. The basic reason was the lack
of financial support from state legislatures. During the years 1880
to 1920, attempts were launched to make institutionalization more
feasible by turning asylums into self-supporting entities financed
by the labor of the residents. 218  A common form which these self-
supporting institutions took was the "farm colony," built on large,
often isolated tracts of land. By 1930, the isolation of the farm
colony institution was both real and accepted.219
209. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
210. DAVIES, supra note 181, at 51-58; DETJTscH, supra note 178, at 369-77.
211. See DAVIES, supra note 181, at 61-64; DEUTSCH, supra note 178, at
372-77.
212. DAVIES, supra note 181, at 65.
213. Id.
214. Address by E.R. Johnstone, president of Association of Medical Officers
of American Institutions for Idiot and Feeble-Minded Persons, in Faribault, Minn.,
June 23, 1904, in Johnstone, President's Address, 8 J. PSYCHo-ASTHENTIcs 63, 66
(1904).
215. 1912 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND
CORRECTIONS, REPORTS FROM STATES 525 (Mass. report).
216. Wolfensberger, supra note 203, at 114.
217. Id. at 115.
218. Id. at 118-119.
219. Id. at 125.
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The extreme social antipathy toward disabled persons which
flared in 1910 had quieted by 1925; however, large institutions
remained far removed from population centers. Although there
was no longer a social rationale for the existence of such sub-
human facilities,220 large numbers of handicapped persons contin-
ued to be placed in these institutional "warehouses" located in the
country.
2. Portrait of the "modern" institution.
Historically, the institution was devised for the purpose of
segregating from society the mentally disabled, epileptics, or those
with multiple or severe physical handicaps. Present-day institu-
tions, most of which are run by states,22' continue to operate in the
spirit of 1925, when inexpensive isolation of a "scarcely human re-
tardate" was the only answer.222 Let us now examine the structure
and operation of those facilities to discover what life in a con-
temporary institution is like.
First, consider the physical plant and thus the lifestyle
dictated by the architecture of a state institution. Typically, the
buildings were designed as monuments, as public relations en-
deavors; they were built for the convenience of the staff, the archi-
tect, and the community, but never for that of the residents. 2
One observer has chronicled some of the dehumanizing conditions
characteristic of today's state institutions:
224
a. A fence or wall surrounding an entire building or
even an entire facility.
b. Barred windows and more sophisticated but equally
effective reinforced window screens (so-called security screen-
ing).
c. Locked living units. In the case of children or physi-
cally handicapped persons, door knobs may be set high above
reach. These restrictive access mechanisms permit staff to per-
ceive the facility as "open" even though it is actually locked.
d. Caretaker stations providing maximum visual con-
trol over resident areas, while minimizing staff involvement.
The glass-enclosed nursing station is a classical example.
e. Segregation of the sexes. Such segregation becomes
an absurd practice with infants and children, as well as the
aged.
f. Large dormitory sleeping quarters, with no (or only
220. Id. at 129-31.
221. DEuTscH, supra note 178, at 380, citing 1944 U.S. Census Bureau figures.
222. Wolfensberger, supra note 203, at 129.
223. Id. at 63, 83-88.
224. Id. at 72-77.
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low) partitions between beds. Lights may burn even at night
to facilitate supervision.
g. Bedrooms lacking doors. Where doors exist they al-
most always contain peepholes,, or "Judas-windows."
h. Toilets and showers lacking partitions, curtains or
doors. Bathing facilities are frequently designed for the effi-
cient cleansing of a large number of residents by a small num-
ber of caretakers: slabs, hoses and mass showers are used
rather than installations conducive to self-cleaning.
i Often no place to store one's personal possessions.
Even if there are such places, frequently they are under lock
and key and inaccessible to the resident. The use of personal-
ized clothing is denied; clothes are supplied from a common
pool.
j. Beds or bed stalls are designed to be picked up and
immersed in cleansing solution in their entirety.
k. Walls and floors made of a material that is virtually
impossible to "deface," scratch, soil or stain. Entire rooms
can be hosed down as in a zoo. Often living units have drains
in the floors.
1. "Segregated" staff lounges to which caretakers with-
draw for meals and coffee, heightening the "we-they" attitude
of supervision and control.
Residents of institutions usually face these oppressive sur-
roundings for a lifetime, because institutionalization is a dead-
end proposition. Few residents are ever released. The Stock-
holm Symposium of 1967 found that the practice is to "institu-
tionalize and throw away the key." '225 The Symposium also com-
mented on the degenerative effect the institutional environment
has upon individual development. 22 1
A description of the physical plant of an average institution
reveals that these facilities are little more than prisons. Listing
the standard architectural and operational restrictions, however,
does not begin to cover the violations of individual rights and
freedoms. Not only is segregation of the sexes prevalent, but seg-
regation from families, normal society and peer groups is also a
product of institutionalization. Inmates are deprived of social
touchstones which most of us take for granted: stores, bus stops,
the neighborhood church, the Burger King, the football stadium.
Restrictions are imposed with respect to visitors and use of the
225. See Shoenfield, Human Rights for the Mentally Retarded: Their Recog-
nition by the Providers of Service, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 31, 46 (1974), citing INTER-
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF SOCIETIES FOR THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, LEGISLATIVE
ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION, CONCLUSIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM SYMPOSIUM
III 3(c), (d), (e) (1967).
226. id. at 39.
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phone, while censorship of incoming and outgoing mail is com-
mon.
2 2 7
3. Legal challenges to institutional confinement: the right
to freedom
The fact that handicapped persons are confined to state
institutions solely because of their mental or physical disabilities,
coupled with the growing realization that these institutions do
little to improve the lost of such persons,228 has produced a recent
upsurge in litigation. In the last decade, reformers have filed law-
suits challenging conditions inside residential institutions and the
very existence of the institutions themselves.
In Rouse v. Cameron,22 the petitioner had been involun-
tarily committed to a mental hospital by a District of Columbia
Municipal Court, which found him not guilty by reason of insanity
of carrying a dangerous weapon.2 10  This was one of the first cases
dealing with the right to treatment, a concept articulated in the
1960's by Dr. Morton Birnbaum, who proposed that
the courts under their traditional powers to protect the
constitutional rights of our citizens begin to consider the prob-
lem of whether or not a person who has been institutionalized
solely because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institu-
tionalization for care and treatment actually does receive ade-
quate medical treatment so that he may regain his health, and
therefore his liberty, as soon as possible; that the courts do
this by means of recognizing and enforcing the right to treat-
ment; and, that the courts do this, independent of any action
by any legislature, as a necessary and overdue development
of our concept of due process of law.
231
The holding in Rouse was that any involuntarily committed
person has a right to treatment. The Rouse court based its
decision on a Washington, D.C., statute which mandated treatment
for those persons committed to a public hospital because of mental
illness. 28 2 The court also indicated, however, that failure to pro-
vide such treatment could raise constitutional questions.238
227. Wolfensberger, supra note 203, at 76.
228. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Birnbaum].
.229. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
230. Id. at 452. D.C. CODE § 22-3215 (1961) provides that carrying a danger-
ous weapon is a misdemeanor for which the maximum imprisonment is one year.
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966). At the time of his ap-
peal, Rouse had been confined four years with no end in sight. Id. at 453.
231. Birnbaum, supra note 228, at 499.
232. D.C. CODE §, 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
233. 373 F.2d at 453.
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In the two years following the Rouse decision, few cases dealt
with the question of a constitutional right to treatment. In 1971,
the important case of Wyatt v. Stickney284 focused squarely on the
inhumane conditions at three Alabama institutions. The Wyatt
court held:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruis-
tic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates
the very fundamentals of due process. 23 1
The Wyatt case involved a class action initiated against state
officials by guardians of patients confined at a state mental hospi-
tal and later joined by certain employees of the hospital.28  Plain-
tiffs contested state budgetary cuts, the resultant termination of
99 employees at Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, and large-scale re-
organization efforts by the Alabama Department of Mental
Health.28 7 A federal district court ruled that the treatment pro-
grams in existence prior to reorganization were scientifically and
medically inadequate; the court required the parties to develop,
promulgate and implement proper standards of treatment.88
Relying upon Rouse v. Cameron,89 the Wyatt decision
declared that where patients were involuntarily committed for
treatment purposes through noncriminal procedures lacking the
constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defendants, they
unquestionably [had] a constitutional right to receive such
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condi-
tion. The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treat-
ment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or
punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitu-
tional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental
institutions such as [the one involved here]. 240
234. 325 F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334
F. Supp. 1341 (1971), enlorced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
235. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (emphasis
'crmitted).
-236. Id. at 782. Defendants included the commissioner and deputy commis-
sioitier of the Department of Mental Health of the State of Alabama, the members
of the Alabama Mdntal Health Board, the Governor of Alabama, and the Mont-
gomery County probate judge (as representative of all other state probate judges).
237. Amended complaints dropped the employees' claims and added to the
plaintiff class residents of Searcey Hospital (for the mentally ill) and Parlow State
School and Hospital (for the mentally retarded). Id. at 782-83. The disputed
reorganization efforts sought to introduce a "unit-team system of delivery of
mental health services and treatment to patients." Id. at 783. The court took
a "wait and see" approach to the new system; see note 245 and accompanying
text infra.
238. 325 F. Supp. at 784-85.
239. 373 F.2d at 451; see notes 229-33 and accompanying text supra.
240. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
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The lack of staff or facilities was no justification for failure to
provide suitable, adequate treatment for the mentally ill or
mentally retarded person.24
The Wyatt court heard testimony from experts in the mental
health and mental retardation fields documenting the shockingly
inhumane conditions at the Alabama institutions. Immediate,
extensive relief was ordered and strict standards were set.242 The
court specified three fundamental elements of the right to treat-
ment: a humane psychological and physical environment, quali-
fied staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment,
and individualized treatment plans. 248  Relief was founded on the
right to due process, but the court stated that denial of equal pro-
tection and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment could
provide additional grounds. 44
The Wyatt opinion also emphasized the mental patient's right
to be treated in the least restrictive setting.245 The clear impli-
cation of the holding was that a person should not be subjected
to institutionalization, which involves extensive curtailment of
liberty, if he can be treated while he remains in the community. 246
The evidence presented to the Wyatt court indicated that long-
term institutionalization in itself leads to deterioration and de-
creases the chance that an individual will be able to cope success-
fully in the outside world. Dr. Gunnar Dybwad, an expert in
the field of mental retardation, testified:
Individuals who come to institutions and can walk stop walk-
ing, who come to institutions and can talk stop talking, who
come to institutions and can feed themselves will stop feeding
themselves, and in other words, in many other ways, institu-
tionalization is a steady process of deterioration. 247
When government restricts an individual's liberty in order to
accomplish a legitimate state purpose, it is constitutionally re-
quired to use the least drastic means to accomplish that pur-
po e. 2 48  The "least rsatrictive stting" concept thus marshals
241. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
242. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972). After hearing
evidence that showed til institutions were overciowded fire hazards, lacking an'
sembli h'e bf privacy, and saddled with a poorly trairied, itnadeqUafe staff and a
non-therapreutic ervironment, the court declared that the treatment being provided
waa grossly inadequate and dehumanizing to the residents. Id. at 74. See MENrA
HEALTH LAw PROJEcT, BASIC RIGHTS OP THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 10-11
(1973).
243. 344 F. Supp. at 376, 379-86.
244. 325 F. Supp. at 781.
245. 344 F. Supp. at 379, 380, 384 (app. A, §§ 2, 7, 26).
246. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, BASIC RIGHTS OF THE MENtALLY HANDI-
1'A PEI3 27 (1973).
247; 1d. at 12.
248. See, e.g,, Cbvidgton v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
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firm constitutional support for the argument that persons who can
be treated without institutionalization should remain in the com-
munity.
While the Wyatt case attempted to remedy the inhumane
conditions in Alabama institutions, it did not deal with the under-
lying problem: the existence of segregated facilities. The formu-
lation of elaborate standards for recordkeeping, staffing ratios,
living conditions and disciplinary policies implies the necessity for
the existence of such institutions. Wyatt never confronted the
basic issue of whether any large-scale, geographically remote, full-
time residential institution could beneficially affect the lives of its
residents.
There is fear among many mental health and mental retarda-
tion professionals that simply improving the conditions at residen-
tial institutions for the handicapped will guarantee their continued
existence. However, serious problems would arise if the residents
of existing institutions were released into the community without
any provision for appropriate community services. The fear that
this might occur has caused many institutional personnel, as well
as parents and families of the residents, to endorse adamantly the
continued existence of institutions, while ignoring the serious vio-
lations of rights that residents suffer every day, every hour of their
lives.
In Welsch v. Likins,24 9 plaintiffs sought an injunction halting
their detention under the conditions existing at Minnesota's
institutions for retarded citizens. Granting the injunction, the
court held that persons civilly committed for reasons of mental
retardation had both a statutory 50 and, under the due process
clause, a constitutional right "to adequate care and treatment de-
signed to give each person a realistic opportunity to be cured or
to improve his or her mental condition. ' ' 251  Most importantly,
Welsch also directed state officials to make good faith efforts to
place mentally retarded persons in settings that would be suitable
and appropriate to their mental and physical conditions, while least
restrictive of their rights. 252 Although Wyatt had enunciated the
right to treatment in the least restrictive environment, 25 3 it did not
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 659-61 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D. Minn. 1974); Morales v. Turmor, 364 F. Supp. 166,
175 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-97 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
249. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
250. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252.28, 253A.01-.21, 253A.02(5), 253A.07(17)(b),
(18) (Supp. 1975).
251. 373 F. Supp. at 499, citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784
(M.D. Ala. 1972).
252. 373 F. Supp. at 502.
253. See notes 245-48 and accompanying text supra.
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impose upon state officials, as Welsch did, the responsibility of
providing care, treatment, and education for the handicapped while
avoiding the serious curtailments of liberty inherent in large,
remote "warehouse"-type institutions.
The United States Supreme Court was asked to rule upon
the issue of whether there exists a constitutional right to treatment
in O'Connor v. Donaldson.2 54 The Court chose not to deal directly
with the issue of a right to treatment, and instead addressed the
basic underlying issue: the right to be free from involuntary insti-
tutionalization.
Mr. Donaldson had been involuntarily confined in a state
mental hospital for 15 years. Throughout his confinement,
Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release, stating that he was
dangerous to no one and that in any case the hospital was not pro-
viding any treatment for his supposed illness. Donaldson brought
a civil rights action, 255 contending that the superintendent and other
members of the hospital staff named as defendants had intention-
ally deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. The jury,
after a four-day trial, returned a verdict in favor of Donaldson and
assessed both compensatory and punitive damages against the
defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a
lengthy opinion, affirmed the lower court finding.2
56
Evidence presented at the trial showed that Donaldson's
confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care.
(This is not at all unlike the so-called "treatment" programs which
hundreds of thousands of mentally ill, mentally retarded, and other
disabled persons currently receive in state institutions.) Since the
evidence also showed that Donaldson was not, nor had ever been,
dangerous to himself or to others, the Supreme Court did not de-
cide whether a person committed on grounds of dangerousness has
a "right to treatment." The Court instead viewed the case as
raising a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important ques-
tion concerning every person's constitutional right to liberty.
257
A close analysis of the language of Justice Stewart's ma-
jority opinion clearly indicates that the Court attacked the basic
premise of institutionalization-that is, the segregation of non-dan-
gerous handicapped persons: "A finding of 'mental illness' alone
cannot justify a State's locking up a person against his will and
keeping him indefinitely in custodial confinement.
2 58
The Court held that "incarceration is rarely if ever a
254. 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), aff'g 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
256. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
257. Id. at 2490-93.
258. Id. at 2493 (emphasis added).
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necessary condition for raising the living standard of those capable
of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help offamily or friends." '259 After all, "may the State confine the
mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to
that they enjoy in a private community? '260  The Court concluded
that even where the confinement was originally constitutionallyjustified, it cannot continue after the need for confinement no
longer exists.26 '
The Court expressed strong disapproval of the premises
underlying the present process of institutionalization:
May the state fence in harmless mentally ill solely to saveits citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different?One might well ask if the State to avoid public unease,
could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or
socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity can
not constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physi-
cal liberty.262
The Donaldson fact pattern is very similar to situations in
which many institutionalized persons find themselves. They havebeen confined not because they are dangerous, nor for "treat-
ment," but because society is unwilling to tolerate their remainingin the community. These handicapped persons, like Mr. Donald-
son, are suffering violations of their constitutional right to free-dom. 263
It is too soon to estimate the ultimate effect of the landmarkDonaldson decision. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Courthas delivered a significant blow to the widespread state practice
of institutionalizing handicapped persons. "Harmless" persons
who are mentally ill or mentally retarded, physically unattractive,
or otherwise socially unacceptable, have the right to remain in the
community if they so choose. 2 4 Although the Donaldson decision
attacked the current legal and philosophical presumptions justify-
ing institutional confinement, it did not address the problem offormulating acceptable criteria for commitment in those limited
cases where it would be legally permissible. Several lower federal
courts, however, have spoken to precisely this issue, the constitu-
tional standards for civil commitment.
Lessard v. Schmidt26 5 challenged the constitutionality of
259. Id.
260. id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2494.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 2493 n.90.
265. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for more spe-
cific order, 414 U.S. 473, ordered accordingly, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974).
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Wisconsin's civil commitment statute as a misuse of state power
which deprived a person of his fundamental liberty to go unim-
peded about his affairs. 266 Lessard was a class action brought on
behalf of all adult persons "held involuntarily pursuant to any
emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provision of the
Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute. ' 267  The court held
that the commitment statute was constitutionally defective insofar
as it
fail[ed] to require effective and timely notice of the charges
under which a person [was] sought to be detained; fail[ed] to
require adequate notice of all rights, including the right to
jury trial; permit[ted] detention longer than 48 hours without
a hearing on probable cause; permit[ted] detention longer than
two weeks without a full hearing on the necessity for commit-
ment; [and] permit[ted] commitment based upon a hearing
in which the person charged with mental illness [was] not
represented by adversary counsel, at which hearsay evidence
[was] presented without the patient having been given the
benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination.
268
Lessard further held that civil commitment would be allowed
only where the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts necessary to show that the individual was mentally ill and
dangerous; mere preponderance of the evidence violated "funda-
mental notions of due process" and was therefore constitutionally
insufficient to justify commitment.269 "Dangerousness," the court
stated, must in turn be "based upon a finding of a recent overt
act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or
another. ' 270 In addition, the court required those persons seeking
commitment to consider less restrictive alternatives.27'
The standards set forth in Lessard have rendered many
current commitment statutes-usually based on superficially phil-
anthropic language calling for commitment "in the best interests
of the individual"-vulnerable to constitutional attack. Most stat-
utes, like the Wisconsin law, require only limited notice of the
commitment hearing and allow the individual threatened with
266. 349 F. Supp. at 1084.
267. Id. at 1082.
268. Id. at 1103.
269. Id. at 1095. For a full discussion of the standards of commitment, see
id. at 1093-97.
270. Id. at 1093. Citing CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5260, 5264 and 5300
(West Supp. 1970), the Lessard court noted:
Even an overt attempt to substantially harm oneself cannot be the
basis for commitment unless the person is found to be 1) mentally ill,
and 2) in immediate danger at the time of the hearing of doing further
harm to oneself.
Id. n.24.
271. Id. at 1096.
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commitment to be absent from the hearing itself. Relying in part
upon Lessard and Donaldson, the California Supreme Court re-
cently adopted a more stringent burden of proof for commitment
in sex offense cases.272 As a result of these decisions, lawsuits
challenging various commitment statutes have proliferated.2 78
Where Lessard applied extensive constitutional protections to
adults in the commitment process, Bartley v. Kremens2 74 applied
those same constitutional protections to children who were threat-
ened with institutionalization. A three-judge federal court de-
clared the Pennsylvania commitment laws for juveniles2 75 to be
violative of the plaintiffs constitutional right to due process. The
court held that a child who faces the possibility of being physically
confined for an indefinite period of time has a true interest in the
potential confinement and the right to a hearing with full dueprocess protections which cannot be waived by any third party,
including the child's parent. 276 This decision recognizes that theprevious practice, which allowed for parental waiver of a pre-
institutionalization hearing, was in fact an involuntary commitment
of the child regardless of any euphemistic statutory language label-
ing it "voluntary. "277
Thus, the courts have significantly restricted the criteria
under which either an adult or a child can be constitutionally com-
mitted to a state institutional facility. There must be full proce-
dural due process as well as a finding of dangerousness and a prior
exhaustion of all the less restrictive alternatives. Implementation
272. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 345, 535 P.2d 373, 377, 121 Cal. Rptr.509, 513 (1975); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 313-25, 535 P.2d 352, 356-64, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-500 (1975). Burnick held that the proper standard
of proof in mentally disordered sex offender proceedings was proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 324-25, 535 P.2d at 364, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 500, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358(1970); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), a!l'd, 95S. Ct. 2486 (1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
273. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v.Wayne County General Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Saville v.Treadway, C.A. No. 6969 (M.D. Tenn., March 8, 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, 313 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Schneider v. Radack,Civ. No. 74-4020 (Cir. Ct., Yankton County, S.D., May 9, 1974).
For an excellent discussion of recent developments in the civil commitment
area, see Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190
(1974).
274. 44 U.S.L.W. 2063 (E.D. Pa., July 24, 1975).
275. Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, 50 PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402, 4403 (1966).
276. 44 U.S.L.W. 2063 (E.D. Pa., July 24, 1975). See also New York St.Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
277. Id. See also Mem. & Order, June 4, 1974, Horacek v. Exon, 357 F.Supp. 71 (D.C. Neb. 1973); Saville v. Treadway, C.A. No. 6969 (M.D. Tenn.,
March 8, 1974).
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of these new commitment standards will probably result in the
institutionalization of far fewer handicapped persons. It is ex-
tremely important, however, to remember that the historical basis
for institutionalization has been the notion that handicapped per-
sons should be isolated. Far too many of our disabled citizens
are still confined in institutions. States must break with the tradi-
tional "treatment" model of providing residential programs and
services in institutions and return handicapped persons to the com-
munity.
Today, many people fail to understand that educational
programming and training for the handicapped works; that
the deaf, the blind and the retarded can learn and can, in
fact, become productive members of society. Most of us see
the handicapped only in terms of stereotypes that are relevant
for extreme cases. This ancient attitude is in part the result
of the historical separation of our handicapped population.
We have isolated them so that they have become unknown
to the communities and individuals around them.
278
Society must follow the lead of the courts in reversing dis-
criminatory practices, and in recognizing that handicapped persons
are citizens who must finally be allowed to exercise their legal and
constitutional right to live normal lives.
III. HANDICAPPED PERSONS ARE ENTITLED TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The fourteenth amendment forbids a state to deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 79
If a state has become significantly involved 2 0 in the unequal treat-
ment of its citizens, the discriminatory treatment-whether legis-
lative, 28  administrative, 2 2 or judicial2S3 -may be challenged
under the equal protection clause. State activity is subject to
judicial nullification where it "individuously '' 2s4 singles out one
278. 118 CoNo. REC. S 1472, 1473-74 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1972).
279. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
280. The state must participate to a significant extent in the alleged discrimi-
nation before the equal protection clause becomes operative. See, e.g., Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961).
281. See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1962) The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 342 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman &
tenBroek].
282. See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 155-56 (1964); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 281, at 342,
353.
283. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948).
284. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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particular group from among those "similarly situated. '285
On the other hand, nearly all statutes and regulations employ
classifications. Under an equal protection analysis, legislatively or
administratively imposed distinctions will be examined in light of
their overall purpose. A classification is "under-inclusive" when
it fails to include all those who are similarly situated with respect
to the general purpose of the law. An "over-inclusive" classifi-
cation affects a wider range of persons than those whom the par-
ticular law may legitimately reach. 2 6 Some laws contain elements
of both under- and over-inclusiveness; 28 7 but the classification can-
not be characterized until after the purpose of the law has been
identified. 288  And whether the degree of "inclusiveness" is
unconstitutionally broad or narrow depends, in turn, upon how
closely the courts will examine the relation between the purpose
of the law and the classification it employs.
A. The "Two-Tiered" Approach
Over the years, the Supreme Court has used various stand-
ards for reviewing state acts which discriminate among classes of
citizens. 289  During the Warren era, the burden imposed upon thegovernment to justify such laws depended on which of the two
levels of scrutiny the Court employed. The "strict scrutiny" test
upheld a classification only if the state convincingly demonstrated
that it was necessary to promote a "compelling" governmental
interest.2 0 In such cases, the state was required to rebut the pre-
sumption that its interest could be furthered by a more carefully
tailored classification or by some less drastic alternative.29' The
rigorous level of scrutiny would be invoked when legislation, or
some other form of state action (1) contained classifications which
were inherently "suspect," such as those based on race29 2 or
nationality,293 or (2) affected a "fundamental right" either ex-
285. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 281, at 344-46.
286. Id. at 346-51.
287. Id. at 352.
288. id. at 346.
289. See, e.g., Gunther, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).
290. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.1, 16-17 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
291. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
292. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); McLaughlin v. Flor-ida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);
Korematsu v. United States, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
293. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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pressly or impliedly guaranteed by the constitution, such as the
right to vote294 or to have offspring.
2 5
A second, less demanding level of judicial review was used
when neither condition for strict scrutiny was present. This alter-
native standard, known as the "rational basis" test, upheld the
classification if it was reasonably related to a legitimate govern-
mental objective. 296  While the burden was upon the state to
demonstrate a compelling interest in strict scrutiny cases, statutory
validity was presumed under the rational basis test.
297
When it applied "strict scrutiny," the Court generally struck
down the challenged state action.298  Until very recently, use of
the rational basis test meant minimal scrutiny and was an almost
sure tipoff that the Court would uphold the classification against
an equal protection attack.299
This two-tiered approach has been criticized as too rigid and
mechanistic. 00 Since 1971, the Burger Court has shown signs of
opting for new, more flexible standards of review.30' Strict
294. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1969); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
295. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); See generally San An-
tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). The concept
of "fundamental rights" explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution (and
thereby triggering strict judicial scrutiny) has been criticized as unsound. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
296. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961), Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957).
297. Lindsay v. Nat'l Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1941).
298. Cf. Trancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
299. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961); Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957).
300. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1972). See also
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-126 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The "upper," or "strict scrutiny," tier has been assailed for lacking basic
analytical firmness. See e.g., Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion
of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966). Active Justices who have
expressed dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the two-tiered approach include
White, in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Brennan, in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, supra; and Douglas, in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
supra at 70.
301. See generally The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972). The Burger Court has declined to extend the amorphous "fundamental
rights" doctrine further. Id. at 12-13; see, e.g., San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971).
In the seventies the "rational basis" approach has become a real test rather
than a mere blanket endorsement of the challenged legislation. Classifications
have been invalidated under the rational basis test in James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
178 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
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scrutiny, however, continues to be invoked where states adopt
classifications well established as "suspect. 30 2  During the past
four years, the Court has added alienage 03 to the "suspect" group,
while broadly implying that women3 °4 and illegitimate children
merit similar consideration. 05
B. Handicapped Persons as a Suspect Class
As a class repeatedly abused and neglected by society and
its public officials and institutions, handicapped persons have a
legitimate claim for special judicial solicitude under the equal pro-
tection clause. Clearly, litigants who are able to secure strict judi-
cial scrutiny of challenged state policies stand the best chance of
having those policies invalidated. Despite the Court's recent
inability to achieve analytical consistency in the equal protection
area, obtaining membership in the small circle of "suspect" classes
would undoubtedly result in strict scrutiny of classifications based
on handicapping conditions.
1. Determining "suspectness."
In a number of cases, the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that legislative classifications focusing upon certain
group traits would trigger a "compelling state interest" analysis.30 6
71 (1971). These cases, as one commentator noted, suggest that the rationalbasis test has acquired new "teeth." The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1972).
Justice Marshall has advocated a "sliding scale" analysis which would employ
a broad spectrum of standards for reviewing purported violations of the equal pro-
tection clause. Marshall's approach would gauge: (1) the character of the classi-fication in question; (2) the relative importance of the alleged deprivation to
members of the class; and (3) the state interests propounded in support of the
classification. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
The number of equal protection cases reviewed by the Court has declined
over the last three years. G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 221 (8th
ed. Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER & DOWLING]. This is at leastpartially due to the Court's newly acquired penchant for invalidating legislative
or regulatory classifications on procedural due process grounds. Classificationsbased on what the Court calls "conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presumptions which
are not universally true in fact, may be struck down unless the individuals ad-
versely affected are given the opportunity to rebut them through case-by-casedeterminations. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Dept' of Agriculture v. Murry, 410 U.S.
924 (1972).
302. E.g., race or national origin.
303. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).304. The plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),held that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect. Id. at 688.
305. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 104 (1972).306. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Loving
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In Korematsu v. United States307 and McLaughlin v. Florida,"'5
the strict scrutiny test was employed because the classification in-
volved was based on race. The same rigorous standards were ap-
plied in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission3 °9 and Graham
v. Richardson310 because in those cases the classifications were
based on alienage. In Oyama v. California,-"' the strict scrutiny
test was applied to a classification based on nationality. Although
the Supreme Court held in these decisions that classifications
based upon race, alienage, and nationality were inherently
"suspect," it did not explicitly enumerate the criteria for determin-
ing what are and what are not suspect classes.3 12
The contours of "suspectness" began to take shape with
Chief Justice Stone's widely heralded Carolene Products footnote:
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corres-
pondingly more searching judicial inquiry.313
The courts have recently relied upon this "discrete and insular
minority" rationale in applying strict scrutiny to laws singling out
aliens 14 and District of Columbia residents.""
Commentators have suggested an additional factor which
classifications based on race, alienage and nationality have in
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944).
307. 323 U.S. 214 (1923).
308. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
309. 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1947).
310. 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1970).
311. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
312. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237
(1974), in which the author contends that the mentally ill comprise a suspect
class. The article discusses various theories which have attempted to define the
characteristic elements of "suspectness". Id. at 1258-68. The author's conclusion
is that legislative classifications which have been held to be suspect (race, nation-
ality and alienage) are tainted with "we-they" over-tones:
Anytime we (a predominately white, American-born and descended leg-
islature) compare ourselves to them (blacks, aliens, and other persons
of foreign ancestry), the court should closely scrutinize the classifica-
tion. If not perfect, the classification must be justified by exigent cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 1251. See generally id. at 1245-58. The "we-they" analysis was developed
by Professor John Hart Ely in Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1973); see, e.g., Note, Mental Ill-
ness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245 n.37, 1250-51 (1974).
313. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
314. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 311, 372 (1971).
315. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1833 (D.C. Cir. 1971); D.C. Feder-
ation of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C..Cir. 1970).
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common: they evoke stereotypes which carry the stigma of in-
feriority. This criterion, it is argued, should be used to identify
other suspect groups.81 6
The Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." 7
articulated still another indicator of suspectness. This case dealt
with a workmen's compensation law318 which provided that illegi-
timate children could recover benefits on the death of their natural
father only if the surviving dependants in higher priority classes did
not exhaust the benefits.31 The Weber opinion strongly implied
that illegitimate children, as a class, warranted special judicial pro-
tection because the class was characterized by "immutability";3 20
like race, illegitimacy was a changeless trait. 21 Speaking for the
majority, Justice Powell also cited the "social opprobrium" suf-
fered by illegitimates. Visiting such condemnation upon the head
of an infant, he stated, was "illogical and unjust. '3 2 2  Such legis-lation was "contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing. 82 8
It was not until the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez324 that the Supreme Court capsulized
the factors which make a classification suspect. Rodriguez was
a class action which unsuccessfully challenged on equal protection
grounds the Texas school financing system's reliance on local
property taxation.8 23  The Court summarized what it termed
316. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv.1065, 1127 (1969); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
LJ. 421, 426-27 (1960).
317. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
318. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:1021(3), 23:1232 (1967).
319. 406 U.S. at 167-68.
320. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973), citing Weber
v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
321. Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1243-
44 n.30 (1974).
322. 406 U.S. at 175.
323. Id.
324. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
325. Id. at 4-18. An extensive analysis of Rodriguez is beyond the scope of
this article. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court's refusal to
apply strict scrutiny to relative differences in programs within an educational sys-tem does not necessarily close the door to a finding of interference with funda-
mental rights when a child is totally excluded from the public education system.
The Court acknowledged:
The argument here is not that children in the districts having relativelylow assessable property values are receiving no public education; ratherit is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that avail-
able to children in districts that have more assessable wealth.Id. at 411 U.S. 23. The Court specifically based its ruling in part on a presump-tion that the state of Texas was providing "an 'adequate' education for all children
in the state." 411 U.S. at 24.
The plaintiff in Rodriguez had argued that unequal educational expenditures
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"traditional indicia of suspectness," stating that classification based
on a group characteristic would trigger strict scrutiny when that
group was
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
or purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.326
Less than two months after Rodriguez, several members of
the Court advocated the addition of one more traits to the list of
suspect classifications. Speaking for a plurality of four, Justice
Brennan concluded that statutory classifications based on sex were
inherently suspect.117  Brennan's opinion noted that "sex, like
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth."3 28 Justice Brennan continued:
[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have the
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to
inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities
of its individual members.
32 9
Thus, sex classification will generally be so over-inclusive as to
bear no relation to an individual's ability to contribute to society.
As the plurality saw it, suspect status is therefore appropriate.
2. Do handicapped persons qualify?
Clearly, handicapped persons possess most, if not all, of those
"indicia of suspectness" thus far enumerated by the Court.3
° Under
ought to receive strict scrutiny because education is a necessary prerequisite to
a meaningful exercise of the fundamental right to speech and the right to receive
information. 411 U.S. at 35-36. The Court replied:
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing sys-
tem occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any
of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interfer-
ence with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending
levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case--no charge
fairly could be made that the system, fails to provide each child with
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the en-joyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process.
411 U.S. at 37. So the total exclusion of handicapped or other classes from the
public school system may call for more careful scrutiny.
326. 411 U.S. at 4-18. This definition of suspectness was utilized in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California in considering
whether women were an "identifiable group" for purposes of alleged grand-jury
discrimination based upon statistical disparities.
327. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-688 (1973).
328. Id. at 686.
329. Id.
330. For a discussion of the way in which classifications based on mental ill-
ness share the philosophical underpinnings of classifications currently recognized
as suspect, see Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237
(1974).
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the Supreme Court's ruling in Rodriguez,3 3 ' to qualify as a suspect
class there need only be a showing that the class has been saddled
with disabilities or historically treated unequally or relegated to
political powerlessness. 3 2 A class may thus establish its eligibility
for suspectness by qualifying under any one of these three criteria.
Handicapped persons qualify as a suspect class under not just one
but all three tests set out in the Rodriguez holding.
It is not difficult to see that handicapped people are "saddled
with disabilities." By definition, a handicap is a disability. And
in addition to the physical, emotional or mental impairment, so-
ciety places numerous limitations or prohibitions upon handicapped
persons. Thus, the disabilities of handicapped individuals are com-
pounded by the unequal treatment afforded them; mental, physical,
and emotional disabilities are exacerbated by disabilities legally and
socially imposed. 33
The "political powerlessness" of handicapped persons couldbe the subject of extensive discussion. Most mentally handi-
capped persons are denied the right to vote by express provisions
in state constitutions and statutes."3 4 All but four states expressly
exclude "idiots" and the "insane." a 5  Several states go further
and exclude all those under some form of guardianship. For
example, the Arizona Constitution states: "No person under
guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane, shall be qualified to
vote at any election ....
With respect to mentally ill people, one commentator has
observed:
,[T]he mentally ill constitute a minority segment of -the polity
which is often disfranchised . . . and which is virtuallypowerless to improve its circumstances through the political
process.387
Physically handicapped persons are often prevented from
voting by official neglect. Transportation difficulties and archi-
331. 411 U.S. 1, 28.
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., notes 16-37 and accompanying text supra.
334. See, e.g., note 50 supra.335. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 308, 333
table 9.4 (1971).
336. ARIz. CoNsT. art. 7, §§ 2, 16-101(5). An Arizona court interpreted thisprovision to disenfranchise any person not sul juris, i.e., incapable of fully caringfor himself. Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948). Other stateshave similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182; ALA. CODE tit.41, § 5(1) (1958); IDAHO CONsT. art. VI, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 1; id. amend.XXIV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. 2, §§ 2, 6; id. art. 17, § 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 89-101(5) (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.350 (Vernon 1956); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 8-2801(7) (1973); 37 HARv. L. REV. 384 (1924).337. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190,
1229 n.153 (1974).
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tectural barriers at polling places (such as narrow doorways, flights
of stairs, and revolving doors) make it difficult or impossible for
those with serious mobility problems to cast their rightful ballots.
Public buildings, particularly those built in the past, have im-
pressive monumental entrances fronted upon by massive
flights of granite steps, pleasant to the eyes of the ordinary
person, but terrifying to the physically handicapped.
338
These and other problems, including restrictions upon the right
to hold public office,83 9 have rendered handicapped persons almost
totally "politically powerless. 340
Section II of this article has discussed many examples of the
egregious "unequal treatment" afforded handicapped persons, both
presently and historically. A strong case can be made, therefore,
that the class composed of handicapped persons meets all three
of the Rodriguez criteria. Under a Carolene Products type of
analysis, those with physical, mental or emotional disabilities would
readily qualify for "more searching judicial scrutiny. '" 3 41 Handi-
capped persons are a distinct minority,342 frequently isolated from
the rest of society.3 43 They bear the brunt of social prejudice
3 44
and tend to be actively and passively cut off from the political
process.3 45 Taking a Weber3 46 approach, many handicaps are im-
mutable characteristics occurring on a random basis, punishment
for which is "illogical and unjust. ' 347 Handicaps have traditionally
338. See Sorkin, supra note 13, at 41.
339. See note 54 supra.
340. In fact, it appears that there may be strenuous resistance in some circles
to the possession of political power by handicapped citizens. For example, in Ok-
lahoma prior to 1971 there were no express limitations upon the right of persons
residing in state mental health and mental retardation facilities to vote. One au-
thor noted that residents of a state facility took advantage of their opportunity
to vote. Ginsberg, Civil Rights of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma, 20 OKLA.
L. REV. 117, 119 (1967). However, not long after that publication, the Oklahoma
Constitution was amended to read as follows:
• ..Nor shall any person be qualified elector of this state who is de-
tained in a penal or correctional institution, who is a patient in an insti-
tution for mental retardation, or who has been committed by judicial
order to an institution for mental illness.
OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
341. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1937).
342. See, e.g., notes 24-36 and accompanying text supra.
343. See, e.g., notes 174-278 and accompanying text supra.
344. See, e.g., note 348 and accompanying text infra.
345. See notes 334-40 and accompanying text supra.
346. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 104 (1972).
347. Id. at 175. Scholars differ as to the "permanence" of mental illness. See,
e.g., S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (1924); K. MEN-
NINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 2 (1963); M. SCHWARTZ & C. SCHWARTZ, SOCIAL
APPROACHES TO MENTAL PATIENT CARE 12-13 (1964); Note, Mental Illness: A
Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1244 (1974). However, while alien-
age is not a permanent, immutable characteristic, aliens are well established as
a suspect class: In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
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meant social opprobrium and stigmatization for those afflicted.348
Indeed, ostracism of handicapped individuals is one of "normal"
society's standard practices.8 4 9 It seems clear, therefore, that under
any of the standards for suspectness enunciated by the Supreme
Court, handicapped persons amply qualify.
Since the Rodriguez decision, at least one state court has
found that handicapped persons do merit strict judicial scrutiny.
In re G.H. 350 concerned disputed obligations among county and
state agencies, a private school, and the parents of a physically
handicapped child regarding payment for the child's education.
The North Dakota Supreme Court declared that under the state
constitution all children had the right to a public school educa-
tion,85' and that handicapped children were entitled to "no less
than unhandicapped children. '3 52  The G.H. opinion expressed
confidence that the Rodriquez Court
would have held that G.H.'s terrible handicaps were just the
sort of "immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth" to which the "inherently suspect" classifica-
tion would be applied, and that depriving her of a meaning-
ful educational opportunity would be just the sort of denial
of equal protection which has been held unconstitutional in
cases involving discrimination based on race and illegitimacy
and sex.358
CONCLUSION
For various reasons, states continue to exclude, neglect and
abuse handicapped persons. Those with physical, mental, or
U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); see, e.g.,Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1244 (1974).348. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972), for a discussion of stigmatization. See also, e.g.,Farina & Ring, The Influence of Perceived Mental Illness on Interpersonal Rela-
tions, 70 ABNORMAL PSYCH., 47 (1965); Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a MoralEnterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULT. &
CLINICAL PSYCH. 159, 162 (1970); notes 174-278 and accompanying text supra.The 1972 withdrawal of vice presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton is a vivid case
in point.
349. See notes 174-278 and accompanying text supra.
350. 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974).
351. 218 N.W.2d 441, 446, construing, N.D. CONST. art. §§ 11, 20. With re-
spect to the integrity of educational guarantees under state constitutions, the court
added: "Nothing in Rodriguez . . . holds to the contrary." Id. at 446, citing
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
352. 218 N.W.2d at 446.
353. 218 N.W.2d at 447, citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);See New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). A
three-judge federal court in Colorado recently indicated that it would be open to
a demonstration that handicapped persons meet the "traditional indicia of suspect-
ness." Colorado Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Colorado, Civil No. C-4620 (D,
Colo. 1973).
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emotional disabilities pose very complex human problems for the
rest of society, which has traditionally responded with an "out of
sight, out of mind" approach."5 4 State legislatures and administra-
tive agencies have projected this view into archaic, inhumane
methods and programs for dealing with handicapped persons.
Historically, handicapped people have been subjected to pur-
poseful unequal treatment of considerable scope, degree and
duration. Handicapped individuals have faced and continue to
face discriminatory treatment in almost every facet of life.
The handicapped live among us. They have the same hopes,
the same fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us.
They are children and adults, black and white, men and
women, rich and poor. They have problems as varied as
their individual personalities. Yet, they are today a hidden
population because their problems are different from most of
ours. Only the bravest risk the dangers and suffer the dis-
comforts and humiliations they encounter when they try to
live what we consider to be normal, productive lives. In their
quest to achieve the benefits of our society they ask no more
than equality of opportunity. But they are faced with
continuing discrimination.3 55
Unequal treatment of handicapped people has been particularly
harsh in regard to confinement in state residential institutions and
denial of equal educational opportunities in public school systems.
Recently, handicapped persons have resorted to the courts
in an effort to challenge some of the discriminatory practices which
have plagued them for so long and to secure a portion of the
equality to which they are entitled by law. These litigative efforts
have, by and large, been successful. Such legal victories, how-
ever, pale in comparison to the ongoing deprivations of handi-
capped citizens' rights and the massive governmental inertia in
meeting their special needs.
354. See, e.g., notes 174-278 and accompanying text supra. Noted educator
S.I. Hayakawa, himself the parent of a mentally retarded son, has commented
upon the social pressures to separate such children from their families. Sullivan,
The Orderly Life of Hayakawa, San Jose Mercury-News, August 24, 1975 (Cali-
fornia Today Magazine), at 6, col. 3-4. Claiming that parents should avoid insti-
tutionalizing a child, Hawakawa stated:
The standard advice ... was not to try and do anything yourself. The
belief was that if you kept the child at home it might be damaging to
the other children, and it would just cause grief. But it isn't damaging
to the other children if they learn from you attitudes of acceptance to
this handicapped child. Our [other] two children have always been very
proud of [our retarded child]. They included him in their lives, taking
him to shows, picnics, and all sorts of things, with the result that they're
better for having had a handicapped brother.
Id.
355. 118 CONG. REC. 3320 (1972).
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An important stepping-stone for handicapped persons in their
rise from the long history of unequal treatment to a position of
equality and dignity in our society would be a recognition by theAmerican judicial system that handicapped persons warrant
special judicial protection as a "suspect class." Strict judicial
scrutiny has already been applied to classifications based on handi-
capping conditions by the supreme court of one state,356 and the
issue will undoubtedly be raised in other cases.357
Overall, it is difficult to imagine any group which meets the
criteria for suspectness laid down by the United States SupremeCourt more precisely than handicapped persons. It is hoped that
the attitudes of more judicial tribunals toward handicapped per-
sons will reflect that of the New York court concerning the consti-tutional rights of handicapped children residing at Willowbrook
State School:
The application of such constitutional guarantees for each
child at Willowbrook so that his full potential no matter howlimited can be obtained, should be the newest mission of thelaw. The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happinessis not reserved to the healthy, ablebodied children and adults.
It applies with even more force and intent to the helpless, thephysically handicapped, the mentally defective and the most
unfortunate of children such as those at Willowbrook. 358
By accepting equality under the law for handicapped persons as
"the newest mission of the law," our society may transform the
sad examples of unequal treatment described in this article into
an agenda of problems to be addressed and remedied with all
possible speed.
356. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); see text accompanying notes349-53 supra.
357. See, e.g., note 353 supra.358. In re D., 70 Misc. 2d 953, 335 N.Y.S.2d 638, 651 (1972).
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